The doctrine of piercing the corporate veil in South Africa: an analysis of the South African approach with lessons from the Canadian jurisprudence by Bailey, Michael
1 
THE DOCTRINE OF PIERCING THE CORPORATE 
VEIL IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH WITH 
LESSONS FROM THE CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE 
BY MICHAEL BAILEY 
SUBMITTED TO THE UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN FACULTY 
OF LAW  
In partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree
MASTER OF LAW (LLM) BY COURSEWORK AND MINOR 
DISSERTATION IN COMMERICAL LAW (WITH A SEMESTER 
ABROAD AT QUEEN’S UNIVERSITY)
SUPERVISOR 
RICHARD BRADSTREET: SENIOR LECTURER, FACULTY OF LAW, 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCIAL LAW, UNIVERSITY OF CAPE 
TOWN 
WORD COUNT 










The copyright of this thesis vests in the author. No 
quotation from it or information derived from it is to be 
published without full acknowledgement of the source. 
The thesis is to be used for private study or non-
commercial research purposes only. 
Published by the University of Cape Town (UCT) in terms 












I, Michael Bailey, present this dissertation in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
the degree of Master of Law (LLM) for the approval of Senate in approved courses by 
minor dissertation and approved courses. The other part of this programme was the 
completion of various courses. 
I declare I have read and understood the regulations governing the submission of Master 
of Law dissertations, including those relating to length and plagiarism, as contained in 
the rules of this University, and that this dissertation conforms to those regulations. 
I know the meaning of plagiarism and declare that all of the work in the dissertation, 
save for that which is properly acknowledged, is my own. I have used the footnote 
convention for referencing. 
I hereby grant the University of Cape Town free licence to reproduce for the purpose of 
research either the whole or any portion of the contents in any manner whatsoever of the 
above dissertation. 
NAME   Michael Bailey 
STUDENT NO  BLYMIC007 
PEOPLESOFT NO 1403725 
DATE   23 February 2020 
SIGNED   
3 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
The most important two people in my life, to my parents whom without their unwavering support 
this dissertation would not have become a reality. Your encouragement and willingness to allow 
me to pursue my academic journey has let me realise my dreams.  I don’t know what my future 
may entail but I know I will always count on your support and wisdom.  
Thank you to my supervisor, Richard Bradstreet, who was has gone above and beyond what is 
expected. I have appreciated your guidance throughout this process, and ability to be a friend when 
necessary. He has provided insightful comments and constructive criticism that has benefitted not 
only my thesis but overall approach to research and writing. Another thank you must be given to 
Mohamed Paleker for his assistance in the successful pursuit of my academic scholarships and my 
appointment as a research assistant for the duration of my Masters. 
I would like to thank Mr Vaso Maric from the Fasken Toronto Office, who was kind enough to 
discuss the Canadian law portion of the thesis, and provide feedback on a jurisdiction that was 
new to me. This gave me the opportunity to explore ways in which South Africa may import the 
success of the Canadian jurisprudence. A special thank you to a friend of over twenty years, 
Geoffrey Allsop, who has taken time to read and comment on countless drafts with no expectation 
of anything in return.  
Finally, a thank you to the University of Cape Town for the opportunity to undertake the LLM 
with a semester abroad to Queen’s University. The chance to compete on an international level 
has given me the necessary exposure to confidently say that we, as South Africans, can rival anyone 
out there. There a many more people who have each left an imprint throughout this process, and 




TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION .......................................................... 6	
1.1	 VEIL-PIERCING ...................................................................................................... 6	
1.3	 RESEARCH QUESTION........................................................................................ 10	
1.4	 DISSERTATION OUTLINE .................................................................................. 11	
CHAPTER TWO: THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY 
AND VEIL-PIERCING ................................................................................ 13	
2.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 13	
2.2 SALOMON V SALOMON ............................................................................................ 13	
2.3 STATUTORY CONFIRMATION OF A JURISITC PERSON ..................................... 14	
2.4 UNCERTAINTY WHEN TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL ............................. 15	
2.4.1 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd (‘Lubner’) ................................ 16	
2.4.2 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde (‘Hülse-Reutter’) ........................................................................... 16	
2.4.3 Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij (‘Amlin’) .................................................................... 17	
2.5 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 18	
CHAPTER THREE: COMMON LAW APPROACH TO PIERCING THE 
CORPORATE VEIL ..................................................................................... 19	
3.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 19	
3.2 COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES ..................................................................................... 20	
3.3 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 25	
CHAPTER FOUR: STATUTORY VEIL-PIERCING PRIOR TO THE 
COMPANIES ACT 2008 ............................................................................... 27	
4.1 STATUTORY APPROACH TO PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL .................... 27	
4.2 PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1973 .............................. 27	
4.2.1 Personal liability ........................................................................................................... 27	
4.2.2 Personal liability is not veil-piercing .................................................................................. 28	
4.3 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN TERMS OF THE CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS ACT 69 OF 1984 .................................................................................. 30	
4.3.1 Interpretation of ‘gross abuse’ ........................................................................................... 30	
4.3.2 Abuse under the Close Corporations Act ........................................................................... 33	
4.5 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 34	
CHAPTER FIVE: PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN TERMS OF 
THE COMPANIES ACT 2008 ..................................................................... 35	
5.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................... 35	
5.2 INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 20(9) .................................................................... 36	
5.2.1 Interpretation ............................................................................................................... 36	
5.2.2 Purposive approach to the Companies Act 2008 ................................................................. 37	
5.2.3 Piercing the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9) ............................................................... 41	
5.2.3.1 ‘Interested person’ ................................................................................................. 42	
5.2.3.2 ‘Unconscionable abuse’ .......................................................................................... 44	
5.1.3.3 ‘Deemed not to be a juristic person’ ....................................................................... 49	
5.2.3.4 ‘Rights, obligations or liabilities’ ............................................................................. 49	
5.2.3.5 No longer a remedy of last resort ........................................................................... 50	
5.3 DOCTRINE OR A REMEDY ....................................................................................... 52	
 5 
5.4 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 54	
CHAPTER SIX: LESSONS FROM CANADIAN JURISPRUDENCE ...... 55	
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND ................................................................. 55	
6.2 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE PERSONALITY .................................................. 57	
6.3 RELEVANT CANADIAN PRINCIPLES ..................................................................... 58	
6.3.1 Improper Purpose .......................................................................................................... 58	
6.3.2 Control ....................................................................................................................... 59	
6.4 ESTABLISHED INSTANCES TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL ..................... 60	
6.4.1 Statutory directive to pierce the corporate veil ........................................................................... 60	
6.4.1.2 Divorce Act ........................................................................................................... 64	
6.4.1.3 Summary of the principles to veil-piercing pursuant to statute ............................... 65	
6.4.2 Fraud exception ................................................................................................................ 66	
6.4.2.1 Introduction ........................................................................................................... 66	
6.4.2.2 Dominance and fraudulent conduct ....................................................................... 67	
6.4.2.3 What is fraud? ........................................................................................................ 67	
6.4.2.4 Application of the principles to Salomon v Salomon .............................................. 69	
6.5 GROUNDS TO REJECT VEIL-PIERCING ................................................................ 70	
6.5.1 Agency........................................................................................................................ 70	
6.5.2 ‘Just and equitable’ exception .......................................................................................... 71	
6.5.4 Enterprise liability ........................................................................................................ 73	
6.6 CONCLUSION .............................................................................................................. 75	
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS ................. 76	
BIBLIOGRAPHY ......................................................................................... 79	
PRIMARY SOURCES .......................................................................................................... 79	





















CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION 
1.1 VEIL-PIERCING  
‘Limited liability is a fundamental principle of corporate law. Yet liability has never been absolutely 
limited. Courts occasionally allow creditors to “pierce the corporate veil,” which means that 
shareholders must satisfy creditors’ claims. “Piercing” seems to happen freakishly. Like lightning, 
it is rare, severe, and unprincipled. There is a consensus that the whole area of limited liability, and 
conversely of piercing the corporate veil, is among the most confusing in corporate law.’1 
  
     
The first principle of a corporation is the right to have separate legal personality independent from 
the directors and shareholders.2 The entity becomes distinct from those who incorporate it and 
those who participate in the active management of the corporation’s business. The corporation is 
owned by shareholders. The shareholders, as the natural persons with ownership rights in the 
artificial entity, retain obligations distinct from those of the corporation. The shareholders thus 
cannot be held liable for obligations that the corporations may be required to fulfil, be it primary 
or collateral, in its business dealings. There is a separation between the company, as a separate 
juristic person, and its shareholder.3 The distinction between the company and its shareholders 
and directors is described as the infamous ‘veil’ to separate the corporation from the owners 
themselves. The benefit of separate legal personality is the second principle afforded to a 
corporation - limited liability of shareholders. As a general principle shareholders are not liable for 
the debts of the company.4 As a separate legal person the company exists in perpetuity despite 
changes in ownership structure. This makes commercial sense, because ‘the primary purpose for 
                                                
1 FH Easterbrook and DR Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 89 (1985) at 89.  
2 See D Collier-Reed., and K Lehmann, eds. Basic principles of business law. LexisNexis, 2010 at 27 for discussion on a 
juristic person. Juristic persons are ‘artificial’ persons – entities that do not have a concrete existence in the way that 
human beings do, but which nevertheless exist in an artificial, legal realm. See further the case of Dadoo Ltd and Others 
v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 at 550. 
3 Shareholders direct their capital into the company with ownership of shares. They own the company in proportion 
to the amount of total shares issued in the company. See further London and Others v Department of Transport, Roads and 
Public Works, Northern Cape and Others (1035/2018) [2019] ZASCA 144 at para 25. 
4 Cassim et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) at 35. 
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the doctrine of separate legal personality is to encourage entrepreneurship, by shifting the risks of 
business failure away from entrepreneurs to creditors and other risk bearers’.5 Managers of the 
business can take necessary commercial risks without the consequence of individual liability.6  
 
The advent of the separate legal personality has brought about a revolutionary vehicle to 
conduct business activities. Simultaneously, it has also created the opportunity for abuse. Those 
who own or control the business are able to escape accountability for the actions of the company. 
The courts have been empowered through corporate law policy, precedent and legislation to pierce 
the corporate veil. Binns-Ward J in Ex Parte Gore7(‘Gore’) describes it as the process ‘to disregard 
the distinctness provided in terms of a company’s separate legal personality’, and allocate 
obligations or liabilities away from the company towards an individual or group of individuals. The 
remedy to pierce the corporate veil under the common law is ‘a judicial philosophy that the 
separate personality of juristic persons should be disregarded only in exceptional circumstances’.8 
The common law cases provided no coherent principles when this would be done, but overlapping 
principles have been deduced from the leading Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) decisions.     
 
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 (‘Companies Act 2008’) was the first 
general statutory provision to pierce the corporate veil in South Africa. This provided the courts’ 
with the general discretion when to pierce the corporate veil. Section 20(9) has set a lower standard 
than the preceding common law to disregard the separate legal personality of the corporation It 
has the potential to ‘erode the … philosophy’ the doctrine, as established by the common law, is 
                                                
5 M Salim. "Corporate insolvency: separate legal personality and directors' duties to creditors." UiTM Law Review 2 
(2004) at 90.  
6 Limited liability does not preclude a court allocating liability in cases such as gross negligence or fraudulent activity. 
These exceptions will be discussed in Chapter 4. 
7 NO and Others NNO [2013] 2 All SA 437 (WCC) at para 29. 
8 Ibid at 27. The court lists various cases of importance on the topic such as Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 (4) SA 1336 
(SCA), at para 23, Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim and Others [2007] ZAWCHC 25; 2008 (2) SA 303 (C), at 
para. 9, and Al-Khafari & Sons v Pema and Others NNO 2010 (2) SA 360 (W), at para. 36. 
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strictly used in exceptional circumstances.9 The ramifications of a lower standard would result in 
the dilution of the principles of separate legal personality and limited liability – the very tenets of 
a corporation.10 Further, ‘by expressly establishing its availability simply when the facts of a case 
justify it’ indicates the standard created by the legislature is lower than previously used as 
‘exceptional’ or ‘drastic’.11 It is submitted the statute creates mandatory opportunities to pierce the 
corporate veil if the threshold has been met, but it will no longer be held to the common law 
standard of exceptional circumstances. 
 
In the South African context separate legal personality is important for its alignment to the 
purposes of the Companies Act 2008 in which section 7 encourages ‘entrepreneurship and 
enterprise efficiency’.12 There is a need to strike a balance between separate legal personality and 
the high standards of governance to ‘encourage the efficient and responsible management of 
companies’.13 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 ensures the requisite accountability for the 
actions of the company in line with Section 7. Disregarding the separate legal personality has the 
potential to ‘encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies’ but also has the 
potential to conflict with ‘encouraging entrepreneurship and enterprise efficiency’.14  
 
While it is important to allow courts sufficient room to determine when to pierce the 
corporate veil on a case by case basis, and not according to a fixed or rigid principle, it is also 
important that proper guidelines be developed to provide certainty to courts and litigants about 
                                                
9 P Levenberg, “The Mystery of the Corporate Veil: Comparing Anglo-American Jurisdictions.” Penn St. JL & Int’l 
Aff. 7 (2019) at 166. See further Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) at para 23. 
10 See Saloman v Saloman and Co. Ltd [1897] AC 22 for further discussion on the importance of the separate legal 
personality of a company.  
11 Ibid at 166. The article quotes Ex Parte Gore at para 34. Citing Amlin (SA) (Pty) Ltd. v. Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) 
at para. 23 (S. Afr.); Knoop N.O. and Others v Birkenstock Properties (Pty) Ltd. And Others [2009] ZAFSHC 67 at para. 23. 
12 Section 7(b)(i) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
13 Section 7(b)(j) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
14 Section 7 of the Companies Act 2008. Piercing the corporate veil more often could give effect to one purpose of 
the Companies Act 2008 and consequently impose on another purpose.  
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when the corporate veil should be pierced.15 The idea of a case-by-case basis provides little 
accuracy when it needs to be done. It is necessary to balance the sanctity of the corporate structure 
and the circumstances that justify the need to disregard it. There is an understandable apprehension 
to frequently employ this remedy. The courts’ acknowledge disregarding corporate personality 
negate the rights given to the corporate as a separate legal person. As Corder has often been quoted 
as saying, ‘law cannot only be a brake; it must also be a driving force for social harmony’.16 Piercing 
the corporate veil requires balancing the conflicting purposes of the Companies Act 2008,  
preserving the separate legal personality of the corporation and the policy considerations that 
inform the decision.  
 
Section 5(2) of Companies Act 2008 provides ‘a court interpreting or applying this Act 
may consider foreign company law’. South Africa’s corporate law has borrowed extensively from 
the North American jurisprudence, and the Department of Trade and Industry ‘contracted a 
largely foreign drafting team led by Phil Knight, a Canadian drafting expert’.17 Canada has 
maintained a continued reluctance towards entertaining any form of veil-piercing. As it has been 
said: ‘courts without the benefit, or the burden, of 200 years of constitutional jurisprudence’ do 
not have the requisite case law within their own jurisdiction to solely rely upon.18 Rather than 
abandoning a comparative interpretation, when ‘carefully used, comparative interpretation is at 
least informative, is often enriching, and at best can be inspiring’.19   
 
                                                
15 Case-by-case decision making may provide less legal certainty but, on the other hand, can provide necessary 
flexibility to determine whether the separate legal personality of a corporation should be disregarded. 
16 H Corder 'Crowbars and Cobwebs: Executive Autocracy and Law in South Africa' (1989) 5 SAJHR 1 at 22. 
17 I Rawoot, ‘Companies Act Farce’ Mail & Guardian. Available at https://mg.co.za/article/2010-04-07-companies-
act-farce. 
18 S Kentridge, Comparative Law in Constitutional Adjudication, The South African Experience in JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO 




South African and Canadian law are rooted in English law. Both jurisdictions have reserved 
veil-piercing to exceptional circumstances. Canadian court decisions suffer the same fate as their 
South African counterparts by not having consistent principles of veil-piercing, but have 
developed two distinct categories that justify the use of the veil-piercing doctrine. The two 
categories being when ‘pursuant to statute’ and ‘fraud-based grounds’.  It is submitted that the 
more restrictive interpretation of veil-piercing in Canada, could assist to create a more consistent 
framework when faced with the prospect of having the separate legal personality of a company 
being disregarded in South Africa. The two categories not only comply with the exceptional nature 
of the remedy but limit its applicability to adequately balance veil-piercing against policy 
considerations in favour of preserving the separate legal personality of a corporation. 
1.3 RESEARCH QUESTION  
This dissertation will seek to clarify with the introduction of the Companies Act 2008, does section 
20(9) provide the potential for resolving the difficulties that exists when the courts will be able to 
pierce the corporate veil? The research will consider the necessary framework for the courts to 
determine when to pierce the corporate veil balanced against policy considerations to maintain the 
separate legal personality of the company.  
 
The research will consider the principles that can be deduced from the Canadian 
jurisprudence, and whether there could be valuable lessons transplanted into the South African 
law in the attempt to create a working framework of when it may be possible to pierce the 
corporate veil. This will not be a comparative analysis of each jurisdiction to consider the 
similarities and differences, more to help improve South Africa’s approach to piercing the 
corporate veil. The choice of Canadian case law should provide a better interpretation of the 
Companies Act 2008, and to resolve any difficulties that the South African courts have faced.  
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1.4 DISSERTATION OUTLINE   
Chapter two of the dissertation will define corporate personality and veil-piercing. Saloman v 
Saloman20 from the English Courts, lays the foundation for the South African and Canadian 
understanding of the separate legal personality of the corporation. Separate legal personality is 
simultaneously circumvented and consequently disregarded to pierce the corporate veil.  
 
From the foundational understanding of the characteristics of the company as a juristic 
person, Chapter three will consider the jurisprudential development of the veil-piercing doctrine 
through the common law. The courts created different and often opposing views when to pierce 
the corporate veil under the common law. Although the Companies Act 2008 has codified the 
common law power of the courts to pierce the corporate veil, there is still uncertainty in 
determining which abuses would justify disregarding the separate legal personality of the 
corporation. The codification of the ‘unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the 
company as a separate entity’ would appear to broaden veil-piercing beyond the scope of the 
common law. The courts – in determining what abuse would be ‘unconscionable’ – have resorted 
to common law principles to interpret the Companies Act 2008.21 The courts have continued to 
consider the factors present in decisions made by the courts in terms of the common law to 
interpret the Companies Act 2008.  
 
Chapter four will introduce the statutes prior to the Companies Act 2008, namely the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘Companies Act 1973’) and Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (‘Close 
Corporations Act’). The imposition of personal liability in the former is no form of veil-piercing, 
whereas the latter only applied to close corporations (‘CC’). Albeit a further development by the 
                                                
20 and Co. Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
21 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
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courts as to when to pierce the corporate veil, there was nevertheless still no statutory provision 
to pierce the corporate veil of companies’ prior the Companies Act 2008.  
 
Chapter five will engage with section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008, and determine to 
what extent the court has created a set of principles that are appropriate to pierce the corporate 
veil. The case of Gore22 coupled with the preceding common-law provide the current precedent for 
when the courts may pierce the corporate veil.  
 
Chapter six will highlight the decisions by the Canadian courts that contain a larger amount 
of jurisprudence on the topic and remain conservative in piercing the corporate veil. The Canadian 
courts’ have limited piercing the corporate veil to two instances: ‘pursuant to statute’ and ‘fraud-
based grounds’. There is greater certainty provided through these limited instances that better 
consistently determine when a court may pierce the corporate veil. This dissertation submits South 
Africa should follow the Canadian approach to limit the veil-piercing doctrine. 
 
Chapter seven sets out my conclusions and recommendations. I recommend a narrow 
interpretation of Section 20(9) of the Companies Act that veil-piercing must only be used ‘pursuant 
to statute’ and ‘fraud-based grounds’ but acknowledge difficulties in applying this approach rigidly. 
In conclusion I will argue that the Canadian concept of veil-piercing should be used to determine 









                                                
22 Gore supra note 7.  
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CHAPTER TWO: THE CONCEPT OF CORPORATE 
PERSONALITY AND VEIL-PIERCING 
 
DEFINITION OF CORPRATE PERSONALITY AND VEIL-PIERCING 
2.1 INTRODUCTION   
Separate legal personality, the very fundamental tenet of company law, separates the shareholders 
and directors from any liability or responsibility that may arise through the course of a company 
and its actions. Salomon v Salomon23, became the foundational case that confirmed the doctrine of 
corporate personality in terms of the Limited Liability Act that has been relied on by courts in 
various jurisdictions.24 The South African courts confirmed this in Dadoo25, where the court held a 
separate entity ‘distinct from its shareholders is not merely artificial and technical thing. It is a 
matter of substance’. The rule remains that a company has a separate legal person distinct from its 
shareholders and directors, and that shareholders are in principle not liable for the debts and 
liabilities of the company.  
2.2 SALOMON V SALOMON   
 Salomon was an English leather merchant who incorporated according to the Companies Act 
1862.26 He sold his business to the company with a ‘nominal capital of 40 000 shares of £1 each’ 
owned 20 001 of the 20 007 issued shares, the remainder owned by his wife and five children.27 
The business structure was setup where Aron Salomon became ‘a secured creditor, a controlling 
shareholder, a director and an employee of the company’.28 The business failed and within a year 
                                                
23 and Co. Ltd [1897] AC 22. 
24 Limited Liability Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 133). 
25 Dadoo supra note 2 at 551. 
26 K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson, ‘Fraud Unravels Everything: A limited Justification for Piercing the 
Corporate Veil’ in Annual Review of Civil Litigation at 558. 
27 Cassim et al op cit note 4 at 33.  
28 Ibid.  
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entered liquidation. Salomon as a secured creditor received preference at the expense of all 
unsecured creditors.  
 
Salomon lost in the lower courts. On appeal the House of Lords held that ‘a shareholder 
is not responsible for the debts of the company irrespective of the number of shareholders and 
that Salomon was not liable for the debts of the company irrespective of the number of 
shareholders, and that Salomon was not liable to the creditors as the alter ego of the corporation’.29 
The company was validly formed and registered, and in its own right a legal person.30 Lord 
Macnaghten laid down the legal principle as follows;  
‘The company is at law a different person altogether from the subscribers to the memorandum; 
and, though it may be that after incorporation the business is precisely the same as it was before, 
and the same persons are managers, and the same hands receive the profits, the company is not in 
law the agent of the subscribers or a trustee for them’.31 
The principles and above dictum from Salomon has been confirmed in South African law by The 
Shipping Corporation of India Ltd v Evdomon Corporation32, which stated that,  
‘it is of cardinal importance to keep distinct the property rights of a company and those of its 
shareholders, even where the latter is a single entity’. 
2.3 STATUTORY CONFIRMATION OF A JURISITC PERSON 
The Companies Act 2008 confirms the existence of the separate legal personality of a corporation. 
Section 19(1)(a)33 expressly establishes the legal status of the company from the time of its 
inception. The section reads as follows: 
                                                
29 Ibid. The result for Salomon was the issued debentures by the company for the purchase price to make him a 
secured creditor were valid against the remaining creditors, and he was not liable for the debts of the company. 
30 Cassim et al op cit note 4 at 33.  
31 Salomon supra note 23 at 51.  
32 & another 1994 (1) SA 550 (A) at 566C-F. 
33 Section 19(1) of the Companies Act of 2008. 
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“(1) From the date and time that the incorporation of a company is registered, as stated in its 
registration certificate, the company—  
(a) is a juristic person, which exists continuously until its name is removed from the companies 
register in accordance with this Act;  
(b) has all of the legal powers and capacity of an individual, except to the extent that—  
(i) a juristic person is incapable of exercising any such power, or having any such capacity; 
or  
(ii) the company’s Memorandum of Incorporation provides otherwise;” 
 
The express acknowledgment of juristic personality in section 19 of the Companies Act 
2008 has been followed in many common-law jurisdictions. Section 15(1) of the Canada Business 
Corporations Act34 states that a corporation has the capacity and, subject to the act, all the rights 
and duties of a natural person. Australia is another example, section 124(1) of the Corporations 
Act35 states that a company has all the legal capacity and powers of a natural person despite any 
restrictions or prohibitions on the exercise of its powers in its memorandum of association. Within 
common law jurisdictions, including South Africa, the formation of the company creates a veil or 
curtain between the company and its shareholders and directors, this is what protects them from 
the liability for the debts and wrongful acts of the company.36 To indemnify the directors and 
shareholders of the company from its corporate actions is what makes the creation of a company 
such an attractive commercial vehicle.  
2.4 UNCERTAINTY WHEN TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL  
Disregarding the separate legal personality is a drastic scenario; it removes the protection provided 
to shareholders and directors. The courts will examine the substance of the company rather than 
                                                
34 R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44. 
35 50 of 2001. 
36 Cassim et al op cit note 4 at 45. 
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the form in which the company is cast.37 The following cases all provide individual attempts to 
define the doctrine itself. Each provide marked differences with no consistency for such a serious 
departure from the rights provided to a corporation.  
 
2.4.1 Cape Pacific Ltd v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd38 (‘Lubner’) 
 
The notion of a variety of circumstances to invoke the doctrine of piercing the corporate veil does 
indicate there is an amount of flexibility of the doctrine. This can be appreciated for the wide-
ranging circumstances a remedy may be provided. Consequently, the flexibility of the doctrine has 
also meant there has been an unpredictable application of the doctrine. The law is not merely an 
academic exercise within the four corners of documents. The Judiciary’s duty ‘is to administer 
justice to those who seek it, fearlessly and impartially’.39 Piercing the corporate veil falls under a 
lacuna in the law when it may be invoked. In Lubner the court defined piercing the corporate veil 
as ‘disregarding the dichotomy between a company and the natural person behind it or in control 
of its activities and attributing liability to that person where he has misused or abused the principle 
of corporate personality’. 40 The case went further to lay out, as best as it could, certain guidelines 
to follow when piercing the corporate veil.  
 
2.4.2 Hülse-Reutter v Gödde41 (‘Hülse-Reutter’) 
 
In Hülse-Reutter, the application was made in terms of section 424 of the Companies Act 1973. The 
company was a foreign company and not within the ambit of the Companies Act 1973. The 
applicant was forced to rely on the common law rules to pierce the corporate veil. The court 
acknowledged that the circumstances ‘in which a court would pierce the veil are far from settled 
and much depends on a close analysis of the facts of each case, considerations of policy and judicial 
                                                
37 Ibid. 
38 1995 (4) SA 790 (A). 
39 J Hlophe. "The Role of Judges in a Transformed South Africa-Problems, Challenges and Prospects." S. African 
LJ 112 (1995) at 22. 
40 (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 790 (A) at para 28. 
41 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA). 
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judgment’.42 The court had set no parameters to when it may be done, but rather it will be a case-
by-case basis to decide when to pierce the corporate veil. It is submitted that the courts concern 
for a case-by-case basis requires a closer consideration of the facts of prior cases in which the court 
proceeded to pierce the corporate veil to reveal overlapping principles.   
 
2.4.3 Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij43 (‘Amlin’) 
 
In Amlin the court was faced with the question if it might be necessary to pierce the veil to allow 
the courts, in rare circumstances, to ‘open the curtains’ of the corporate entity in order to see for 
itself what is obtained inside. 44 Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd and Amlin Holdings BV, a corporation based 
in the Netherlands, were both owned and controlled by Mr. Von Waesberghe. Mr Van Kooij, the 
Respondent, who was employed by Amlin Holdings BV and was owed a significant amount of 
money by the company. R70 000 was paid to the Respondent through Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd.  The 
court was required to rule on whether these payments were a loan from Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd, or a 
deduction from the amounts owed to the Respondent by Amlin Holdings BV. 
 
These ‘so-called separate legal entities were separate only in name and for the convenience’ 
of Mr. Von Waesberghe.45 The court went further to say veil-piercing will only be ‘necessary and 
obligatory in circumstances where justice will not otherwise be done’.46 Veil-piercing was used for 
the court to determine that, 
‘Amlin Holdings BV owed the Respondent a substantial amount of money which despite his 
consistent demands was never paid in full to him. Part payment was facilitated through Mr. Von 
Waesberghe and Amlin SA, an entity directed and controlled by Mr. Von Waesberghe’.47  
                                                
42 Ibid at para 20. 
43 2008 (2) SA 558 (C). 
44 Ibid at para 12. 
45 Ibid at para 25. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Ibid at para 29. 
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The profits of the company belong to the company, as well as all the debts and liabilities of the 
company.48 The consequence of veil-piercing is that liability normally imposed on the company is 
attributable onto the shareholder(s) or director(s) in terms of personal liability.49  
2.5 CONCLUSION  
Salomon upheld the separate legal personality of the company and provided no remedy to creditors 
of the company. With the importance of separate legal personality established, the South African 
common law cases have created a working definition of veil-piercing when there is failure to 
observe corporate formalities, the form is used to promote fraud, injustice or the use of the 
company is a mere façade to hide the true facts.50 The decision to pierce the corporate veil is a 
binary one, it does not allow for anything in between.  
 
Mere guidelines and principles have been criticised for the fact that it has not brought 
about the necessary certainty in determining when the veil may be pierced. John Braithwaite argues 
that ‘precise rules more consistently regulate simple phenomena than principles’ but as the 
regulated phenomena become more complex, principles deliver more consistency than rules’.51 
Rules bring about specific prescriptions where as principles result in more unspecific prescriptions. 
The principled approach has become problematic with cases of similar facts having resulted in 
different decisions to pierce the corporate veil. Having set out the basic principles of separate legal 
personality and piercing the corporate veil, I will now consider the common law approach to 
piercing the corporate veil in the next chapter. 
 
 
                                                
48 Hughes v Ridley 2010 (1) SA 381 (KZP) at paras 22–3. 
49 Lubner supra note 38 at para 28.  
50 J Macey., & J Mitts. (2014). ‘Finding order in the morass: The three real justifications for piercing the corporate’ 
veil. Cornell L. Rev., 100, 99 at 101. 
51 J Braithwaite. (2002). Rules and principles: A theory of legal certainty. Austl. J. Leg. Phil., 27 at 47.  
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CHAPTER THREE: COMMON LAW APPROACH TO 
PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter will examine the jurisprudence of the courts’ to pierce the corporate veil 
with only the use of the common law available. Under the common law, the courts’ reliance on 
principles and standards as to when it may be done was not only inconsistent but varied 
drastically.52 It is submitted that the leading cases of Hülse-Reutter and Lubner provide the most 
consistent principles that will inform the courts’ when to make use of the veil-piercing doctrine. 
There was partial codification of veil piercing under the Companies Act 1973 and the Close 
Corporations Act. The Companies Act 2008 contains the current provision for statutory veil-
piercing. Section 20(9) allows for the court to declare that a company is not a juristic person, but 
still allows judges to substantiate through common law principles. The lack of a unified approach 
at common law has meant any two judges may select contradicting judgments as a justification for 
their interpretation of the Companies Act 2008. Veil-piercing serves an important function and 
provides for accountability and to ensure there is liability when there is a case of misuse or abuse 
of the principle of corporate personality.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (‘SCA’) has noted that there is no set categories of when to 
pierce the corporate veil.53 The perceived consequence of categorisation is a restrictive list of 
instances when the corporate veil may be pierced. Cassim et al raise a valuable point that ‘a danger 
of the categorising approach is that a situation may arise where justice or equity calls for the court 
to pierce the veil, but a court may refuse to do so on the ground that the facts of the situation do 
not fit into any of the established categories’.54 When veil-piercing is not used the courts are 
                                                
52 The consequence of veil-piercing away from the corporation to the person(s) behind it or whoever may be in control 
of its activities as if there were no dichotomy between such a person and the company remains consistent. The 
approach used to achieve this end has been a case for concern. 
53 Ibid. 
54 Cassim op cit note 4 at 43. 
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choosing to uphold the separate legal personality of a corporation. In turn, a principled approach 
will allow the facts of each case to be considered on its individual merits. The perpetrators who 
have taken part in the aforementioned abuse have a greater chance to evade liability when it is 
clear there is a level of abuse that does not suit the pre-determined categories.55  
3.2 COMMON LAW PRINCIPLES  
The company is given the privileged state of existence as a juristic person.56 Lord Chancellor Baron 
Thurlow’s famous adage that, a company has ‘has no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked’ 
best encapsulates the difficulty the courts face to best impose liability on a  juristic person.57 The 
corporation as a legal person is merely a legal concept and has no physical existence.58 The 
common law case law of when it may be appropriate to pierce the corporate veil and seek out and 
hold someone accountable for the actions of the company has found no universal principles that 
may be relied upon. The case law reveals the emergence of a set of relevant principles and those 
that have become the most important to justify the use of the veil-piercing doctrine.  
 
3.2.1 Unconscionable injustice 
In the decision of Botha v Van Niekerk59 (‘Botha’), the court labelled the standard of improper conduct 
as having to be that of ‘unconscionable injustice’ to pierce the corporate veil. If one were to set the 
standard of unconscionable injustice, liability may only be imposed when it meets this threshold. Prior 
to Botha, in Lategan v Boyes60, the court held that ‘fraud is the essential requirement for piercing the 
corporate veil and that a fraud committed by the company need always be present before the 
                                                
55 See further Chapter 6 for the success of the Canadian approach through categorization. 
56 See Chapter 1 for a full discussion of a juristic person as per section 19(1) of the Companies Act 2008. 
57 Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 1956 (1) SA 602 (A) 606; Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Public Works 2010 (2) SA 167 (SCA) para 4; Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1914–15] All 
ER Rep 280 (HL) 283; Re GJ Mannix Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 309 at 311 and Northern Homes Ltd v Steel-Space Industries Ltd 
(1976) 57 DLR (3d) 309 para 22. 
58 Cassim op cit note 4 at 31. 
59 Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (W). 
60 Lategan and Another NNO v Boyes and Another 1980 (4) SA 191 (T). 
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courts can pierce the veil’. Flemming J in Botha disagreed with the assertion that fraud is necessary.61 
This is the first clear stand against the categorisation of a fraud category to pierce the corporate 
veil. Thus, Flemming J created the principled standard of ‘unconscionable injustice’, and rejected 
the need for fraud. Lubner accepted the premise of a non-categorisation approach but rejected the 
test set in Botha as ‘too rigid and held that a more flexible approach ought to be adopted, which 
would allow the facts of each case ultimately to determine whether the piercing of the veil was 
called for or not’.62 It is submitted that the presence of fraud as a category should not be wholly 
rejected. Fraud provides a clear instance of abuse, injustice or any synonymous term the courts 
have used. It is submitted that the presence of categories of conduct that invoke veil-piercing may 
provide greater consistency.63 
 
3.2.2 Salutary principle   
The courts have laid down a few principles of when the courts will accept the aggrieved litigant’s 
application to pierce the corporate veil. In Lubner, the court determined that separate legal 
personality is a ‘salutary principle that our courts should not lightly disregard’.64 Thus, maintaining 
that only in exceptional circumstances, where the corporate veil is pierced, will the shareholders 
be required to pay the debts of the company.65 The consequence of lightly disregarding the separate 
legal personality of the corporation would ‘negate or undermine the policy and principles that 




                                                
61 Botha supra note 59. 
62 Cassim op cit note 4 at para 49. 
63 See Chapter 6 for the approach adopted in Canada for ‘fraud’. 
64 Lubner supra note 38 at para 31.  
65 Cassim op cit 4 at para 39. 
66 Lubner supra note 38 at para 31. 
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3.2.3 Necessity of fraud  
In Lubner, the court noted there must be an enquiry into whether there is ‘fraud, dishonesty or other 
improper conduct’.67 In the presence of such conduct, the court will follow a second enquiry of, 
‘a balancing approach … that requires the concept of separate legal personality being weighed against 
those principles and policies in favour of piercing the veil. In adopting such an approach, a court would 
be entitled to look to substance rather than form’.68  
The court seemingly ruled that fraudulent conduct is not necessary, but its presence will be a strong 
consideration in favour of piercing the corporate veil. 
 
3.2.4 Unfair advantage  
Another relevant principle the common law courts deduced was that those who control the company 
must have gained an ‘unfair advantage’.69 In Hülse-Reutter, the court defined this as a party being 
‘unfairly prejudiced by the distinction which exists between the company and those who control it’.70 
The International Institute of the Unification of Private Law (‘UNIDROIT’) permits a party to 
‘avoid the contract or an individual term of it’ in cases where ‘the other party has taken unfair 
advantage of the first party’.71  In veil-piercing cases, an unfair advantage has already taken place 
and it may not be avoided. Rather, it allows the court to assist in rectifying the consequences of 
this unfair advantage.  The court in Hülse-Reutter ruled there was little evidence for ‘the abuse nor 




                                                
67 Hülse-Reutter supra note 41 at para 20.  
68 M Henkeman, ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil’, Polity, Available at: https://www.polity.org.za/article/piercing-the-
corporate-veil-2014-04-10 [Last Accessed on 9 October 2019]. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Hülse-Reutter supra note 41 at para 21. 
71 Article 3.2.7 of the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International 
Commercial Contracts (Rome 2010) (‘UNIDROIT Principles’). 
72 Hülse-Reutter supra note 41 at para 24. 
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3.2.5 The general discretion of veil-piercing 
In the later decision of Hülse-Reutter the court confirmed it ‘has no general discretion simply to 
disregard the existence of a separate corporate identity whenever it considers it just or convenient 
to do so’.73 Like Lubner, Hülse-Reutter also rejected the standard of ‘unconscionable injustice’ set in 
Botha to disregard the separate legal personality. The court reiterated many different factual 
instances that may satisfy the requirements to pierce the corporate veil: 
‘The circumstances in which a court will disregard the distinction between a corporate entity and 
those who control it are far from settled. Much will depend on a close analysis of the facts of each 
case, considerations of policy and judicial judgment. Nonetheless what, I think, is clear is that as a 
matter of principle in a case such as the present there must at least be some misuse or abuse of the 
distinction between the corporate entity and those who control it which results in an unfair 
advantage being afforded to the latter.’74 
Although the court acknowledged difficulty of determining when it may be appropriate, it did 
nevertheless highlight a need for ‘misuse or abuse’.  The combined of facts are measured against 
a matrix of interlinking principles that will decide on whether to apply the veil-piercing doctrine 
under the common law. The common theme remains that the decision is not one made lightly, and 
should first look to uphold the separate legal personality, and not disregard it merely when it feels it 
is just to do so.  
 
3.2.6 Process of veil-piercing  
Gower, which the court in Lubner, wrote with approval that ‘a company can be a facade even 
though it was not originally incorporated with any deceptive intention; what counts is whether it 
is being used as a façade’.75 Veil-piercing can used for a single action by the company and thus, 
‘there is no reason in principle or logic why its separate personality cannot be disregarded in 
                                                
73 Hülse-Reutter supra note 41 at para 20  
74 Ibid at para 20.  
75 Gower, Principles of Modern Company Law (5th ed. 1992) at 133. 
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relation to the transaction in question (in order to fix the individual or individuals responsible with 
personal liability)’.76 This ensures there is a suitable remedy for the action, but also guarantees that 
the company retains its full rights and obligations as a separate legal person in all other instances.  
 
3.2.7 Remedy of last resort  
In Lubner, the court felt it is not necessary that the plaintiff exhaust all alternative remedies.77 
Alternatively, in Hülse-Reutter, did believe that for such a drastic remedy as piercing the corporate 
veil it must be a method of last resort.78 Reliance was initially placed on Section 424 of the 
Companies Act 1973.79 When the company’s claim was against a foreign company that did not fit 
the definition of a company in terms of Section 2(2), reliance had to be placed upon the common 
law remedy of piercing the corporate veil.80 The facts of the case did not provide the aggrieved 
litigant with any alternatives. Consequently, the court ruled it as a remedy of last resort in default 
for no alternative remedy available. Hülse-Reutter has been followed by the lower courts. In Amlin 
stated:   
‘it must be resorted to rather sparingly and indeed as the very last resort in circumstances where 
justice will not otherwise be done between two litigants. It cannot, for example, be resorted to as 
an alternative remedy if another remedy on the same facts can successfully be employed in order 
to administer justice between the parties’.81  
 
It is submitted that the facts before the court in Hülse-Reutter did not allow for another remedy 
which informed their decision to state the doctrine as a last resort. In Lubner, the court stated: 
‘If the facts of a particular case otherwise justify the piercing of the corporate veil, the existence of 
another remedy, or the failure to pursue what would have been an available remedy, should not in 
                                                
76 Lubner op cit note 38 at para 26. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Hülse-Reutter supra note 41 at para 23. 
79 Ibid at para 5. 
80 Ibid. 
81 Amlin sura note 43 at para 23. 
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principle serve as an absolute bar to a court granting consequential relief. The existence of another 
remedy, or the failure to pursue one that was available, may be a relevant factor when policy 
considerations come into play, but it cannot be of overriding importance.’ 
Thus, the decision in Lubner would find wider acceptance in instances where there are in fact 
alternative remedies available. It is submitted piercing the corporate veil is albeit one legal remedies 
that may be available, and the presence of alternatives should not prevent such relief.   
3.3 CONCLUSION  
The veil piercing at common law has resulted in uncertainty when to pierce the corporate veil. 
There do remain four overlapping principles from Lubner and Hülse-Reutter. First, in both cases the 
courts have still shown a general apprehension to pierce the corporate veil under the common law. 
What cannot be stated with too much degree of certainty is what would be enough for the courts 
to justify the need to disregard the separate legal personality of the corporation. The common 
theme remains that the decision is not one made lightly, and should first look to uphold the separate 
legal personality, and not disregard it merely when it feels it is just to do so. Secondly, Lubner held the 
presence of fraud at common law is not a necessary requirement, rather there must be some misuse 
or abuse of the corporation personality of the company. Thirdly, Hülse-Reutter held the 
consequence of this will be some unfair advantage to the controllers of the company. Finally, 
Lubner held the decision to pierce the corporate veil must be balanced against policy considerations 
in favour of preserving the separate legal personality of a corporation.82 
 
Questions remain as to the impact of the availability of another remedy on the courts 
willingness to invoke the veil-piercing doctrine. As it has been submitted, although both judgments 
differed, the decision of Lubner finds greater acceptance for a party will not be precluded from 
selecting a remedy despite alternative remedies available. Having discussed the common law 
                                                
82 Ibid. 
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principles to piercing the corporate veil, I will now consider the veil-piercing under the statute, 
































CHAPTER FOUR: STATUTORY VEIL-PIERCING 
PRIOR TO THE COMPANIES ACT 2008  
 
4.1 STATUTORY APPROACH TO PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
The courts were given no opportunity through statute to pierce the corporate veil prior to the 
Companies Act 2008.83  The Companies Act 61 of 1973 (‘Companies Act 1973’) allowed for the 
court to impose personal liability on directors, but there wasn’t an overarching provision available 
to pierce the corporate veil. This chapter will identify that personal liability is not veil-piercing. 
Unlike the Companies Act 1973, the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 (‘Close Corporations 
Act’) provides for the court to disregard the separate legal personality, but only of a close 
corporation (‘CC’). The Close Corporations Act assisted the courts in finding what may be 
appropriate standards when any conduct, not listed situations, could be sufficient to pierce the 
corporate veil. The different standard of ‘gross abuse’ coupled with applicability to close 
corporations alone has limited the usefulness of the provision to interpret section 20(9) of the 
Companies Act 2008.  Each Act will be dealt with in turn. The failure of the the Companies Act 
1973 to have a general provision to pierce the corporate meant reliance would have to be placed 
on the common law. The Close Corporations Act had a limited scope, and differed to the language 
used in Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008.   
4.2 PERSONAL LIABILITY UNDER THE COMPANIES ACT 1973  
4.2.1 Personal liability  
 
The Companies Act 1973 did not give the court the power to directly pierce the corporate veil, 
but it provided avenues of accountability.84 The courts were empowered to hold the controllers 
personally liable for the debts of the company in certain circumstances.85 Personal liability is but 
                                                
83 The following chapter will examine how the Companies Act 1973 only provided for personal liability, that is not 
veil-piercing. Where as the Close Corporations Act only applied to close corporations. 
84 Cassim et al op cit note 4 at 63. 
85 Companies Act 61 of 1973. The following discussion will consider the various circumstances where personal liability 
may be imposed on the controllers. Although it may have provided statutory grounding for the aggrieved litigant, it 
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one of the remedies the courts’ may use when piercing the corporate veil. While personal liability 
was ‘always a possibility under the 1973 Act and the common law, the 2008 Act has introduced 
statutory remedies’. 86  The Companies Act 1973 had various instances to allow the court to impose 
personal liability for the debts and liabilities of the company.87 It is submitted that personal liability 
under the Companies Act 1973 does not equate to veil-piercing.  
 
4.2.2 Personal liability is not veil-piercing  
The strict categories of personal liability under the Companies Act 1973 were deficient. There was 
no general catch-all provision to pierce the corporate veil. This meant actions that could justify 
imposing personal liability would fall outside the ambit of the Companies Act 1973. Examples of 
personal liability can be found in sections 50(3), 66, 172(5)(b), 280(5), 344(h) and 424.88 Veil-
piercing did occur when directors are held liable for the ‘loss, damages or costs sustained by the 
company as a consequence of the actions of the director’.89 Blackman described these instances as 
the process of lifting the veil. This is distinguishable from piercing, for these sections have ‘rules 
to be applied by the court [and] is not faced with the question of whether or not to pierce the 
veil’.90 Liability upon a director itself does not equate to veil-piercing.  
 
Blackman states ‘the imposition of liability on the directors of a company cannot ever 
constitute piercing the corporate veil’.91 The court is empowered to impose personal liability as a 
remedy when veil-piercing, personal liability is not itself veil-piercing. Agents of the companies are 
not liable for the rights and obligations of the contracts entered into on behalf of the company. 
                                                
still remains a narrow avenue, that pertains to a more of a categorization approach than general conduct of the 
controllers. 
86 Cliffe Dekker Hofmeyr, Corporate Governance – A Guide for Directors. Available at: 
https://www.cliffedekkerhofmeyr.com/export/sites/cdh/en/sectors/downloads/Corporate-governance-A-
directors-guide.pdf [Last Accessed 9 January 2020]  
87 P A Delport et al ‘Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 2ed Butterworths: Lexis Nexis, (2011) at 46[4]. 
88 The provisions of personal liability are beyond the scope of this dissertation. 




The liability of directors is not by way of the contracts they may enter into on behalf of the 
company for they are agents of the company.92 This will not interfere with the separate legal 
personality of the corporation. Agents contract on behalf of the principal, that being the 
corporation. Personal liability imposed through the Companies Act 1973 is rather an exception ‘to 
the rule that agents are not liable under contracts entered into on behalf of their principals’.93 It is 
submitted the application of the personal liability is not dependent on any standard of abuse 
required to pierce the corporate veil. Personal liability follows the law of agency, which is a 
completely separate set area of law. 
 
What all the aforementioned provisions reveal is threefold. First, to rely on the personal 
liability provisions requires the court to apply a set of rules to the conduct of a director. Second, 
the remedy of personal liability is predetermined. Third, personal liability of directors is an 
exception to the laws of agency, and has no impact on the separate legal personality of the 
corporation. The Companies Act 1973 had a numerus clausus of when to impose personal liability. 
and was devoid of any provision to pierce the corporate veil. Formulating a legal argument and 
judgment requires the strongest claim to be based in a statutory provision, and failing this the 
common law. Thus, veil-piercing would only be possible under the common law. It is impractical 
to expect the legislature to foresee all potential abuses of the company. The Companies Act 2008, 
which will be discussed later, gives the court the general discretion to pierce the corporate veil to 




                                                
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid.  
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4.3 PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL IN TERMS OF THE CLOSE 
CORPORATIONS ACT 69 OF 1984 
Section 65 of the Close Corporations Act permitted the court to rule a close corporation is not a 
juristic person.94 The statutory remedy provided the courts’ with a general discretion when to 
pierce the corporate veil. The Close Corporations Act required ‘gross abuse’ to which the ‘court 
may declare that the corporation is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of such 
rights, obligations or liabilities of the corporation’.95 As the name suggests, this remedy only found 
application to a CC. The limited remedy did little to advance a statutory remedy that could be used 
for all corporations unless incorporated in terms of the Close Corporations Act as a CC.  Below I 
will discuss the case law illustrates the standard if considering whether there has been an abuse 
and what may constitute ‘gross abuse’. This has limited application to the Companies Act 2008 
which has the standard of abuse as ‘unconscionable’.  
 
4.3.1 Interpretation of ‘gross abuse’   
 
Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe96 (‘Haygro’) 
 
In Haygro the court found ‘gross abuse’ where the name of the close corporation had not been 
displayed anywhere on the corporation’s business premises, documents or correspondence. 97 This 
was in contravention of Section 23(1)(a) of the Close Corporations Act for ‘Every corporation 
shall display its registered full name … on the outside of its registered office’.98 Persons conducting 
their business through a CC must ensure they are compliant with the Close Corporations Act. The 
court held a failure to display the name of the corporation ‘constituted a gross abuse of the juristic 
personality of the corporation as a separate entity’.99  The veil-piercing doctrine enabled the court 
                                                
94 Section 65 of the Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984. 
95 Ibid. 
96 en Andere 1996 (4) SA 1063 (C). 
97 Ibid. 
98 Section 23(1)(a) of the Close Corporations Act 63 of 1984. 
99 Cassim et al op cit note 4 at 60.  
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to determine that the members of the CC would be jointly and severally liable for the debts of the 
CC.  
 
TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis100 (‘TJ Jonck’) 
 
In another case of TJ Jonck, the member gave significant loans to the CC in full well knowing the 
CC had conducted business under insolvent circumstances .101 Further, the same member had 
given written authorisation for the registration of a notarial bond over the movable property of 
the corporation as security for his loans to the corporation.102 Unsurprisingly, within a couple of 
months, he was granted an order to take possession of the movables as a right from his notarial 
bond. For the member this meant the business was acquired in his name without any of the 
creditors that, if having recalled the necessary loans, would have rendered the prior CC insolvent.103 
The notarial bond created a transaction that allowed the business to transfer to the member. The 
business remained in the same premise, with the same equipment and stock but merely under a 
new name.  
 
Consequently, the creditors were unable to realise their debts for there were not any assets 
in the original CC’s name. The court ruled this was a form of reckless lending in contravention of 
Section 64 of the Close Corporations Act.104 The court was ready to accept that for the purposes 
of Section 65, the member would also be held liable for the ‘gross abuse’. The protection of the 
member’s own loan, was against the interests of the CC’s creditors that would give them no 
recourse in the case of the inevitable debt. The company structure was abused for it would remain 
an empty vessel. Any rightful creditor may succeed in a claim but have no assets or insufficient 
assets to satisfy the claim. The principle we can deduce from the case law as discussed, is if there 
                                                
100 NO en ’n Ander 1998 (1) SA 971. 





is a contravention of any provision of the Close Corporations Act, the court will determine it is a 
form of ‘gross abuse’. The courts must determine whether any contravention of provisions of the 
Companies Act 2008 would meet the standard of ‘unconscionable’ abuse.   
 
Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim105(‘Ebrahim’) 
 
The most relevant section 65 case, Ebrahim is helpful in considering various factors as to what may 
constitute ‘gross abuse’. Even though, on appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal ruled on the same 
provision as TJ Jonck for the contravention of Section 64 of the Close Corporations Act, the 
decision in the Cape High Court will provide good context for the observation of Section 20(9). 
The court found the CC formed ‘a conglomerate of associated family businesses that were 
conducted with scant regard for the separate legal personalities of the entities concerned’ and the 
CC was 
‘incorporated for the specific purpose of taking over another family’s businesses so as to avoid 
the liquidation of the business and the personal consequences …. With the object of defrauding 
the businesses creditors and facilitating the continued trading of the insolvent business’.106  
In contravention of a series of provisions in the Close Corporations Act, the CC had failed to 
appoint an accountant from the time it commenced business until the date of closure which was 
more than the six month allowance and did not keep proper accounting records.107  
 
In TJ Jonck the member was able to remove the assets from the company by way of notarial 
bond, in Ebrahim the CC was created to assume all the debts of the family businesses to allow the 
business to continue and prevent the plaintiff, the creditor, to retrieve the debts owed.108 The net 
result was the same for the creditors in both instances unable to exercise their rights. In both cases, 
                                                
105 2008 (2) SA 303 (C). 





the CC had neither assets nor the ability of ‘trading profitability and meetings its financial 
commitments to its major supplier as and when they fell due’.109 The conduct was running the CC 
as if it were their own, and when ‘it suited them they chose to ignore the separate juristic identity 
of the corporation’.110 The court saw fit to hold the defendants personally liable because after all 
their egregious actions they could not ‘now choose to take refuge behind the corporate veil’ to 
avoid liability that emerged due to the indistinguishable nature between the company and 
themselves.111 A repetitive theme that emerges is the presence of fraudulent behaviour was 
justifiable to establish ‘gross abuse’. Although fraud was not necessary for the purposes of veil-
piercing at the common law, it is submitted that fraud satisfied ‘gross abuse’ and should satisfy the 
standard of ‘unconscionable abuse’ set by the Companies Act 2008.  
 
4.3.2 Abuse under the Close Corporations Act  
 
The above discussion illustrates cases where ‘gross abuse’ under section 65 of the Close 
Corporations Act was established which justified the court piercing the corporate veil and 
disregarding the separate legal personality of the corporation. The question for Section 20(9) of 
the Companies Act 2008 is whether there is a difference between ‘gross abuse’ from the Close 
Corporations Act and ‘unconscionable abuse’. One must consider to what extent something will 
be ‘unconscionable’, when there is little indication whether unconscionable or gross remains a 
higher threshold of abuse. The court has had to consider what amounts to ‘abuse’ to determine 
when it may be appropriate to disregard separate legal personality of a juristic person. The 
discussion of Section 65 of Close Corporation Act and the common law will be a useful 
foundational premise to interpreting ‘abuse’ in terms of section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
2008.112  
                                                
109 Ibid. 
110 Ibid.  
111 Ebrahim supra note 104 at para 52.  
112 Cassim op cit note 41§ at 62. 
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4.5 CONCLUSION 
The specific listed instances of personal liabilit under the Companies Act 1973 offered little 
opportunity to encompass the wider conduct that would justify the need to disregard the separate 
legal personality of a company. Criticism of the company law regime was that it was ‘highly 
formalistic, making it burdensome and costly to form and manage an enterprise and creating 
artificial preferences for certain structures’.113 The Companies Act 1973 and Close Corporations 
Act helped to perpetuate the conduct and listed personal liability acts meant certain activity could 
not justify piercing the corporate veil when it may be justifiable. The only fall-back remained the 
variable standards created by the common law. The more recent Close Corporations Act was more 
suitable to cover the range of conduct that may justify the need to disregard the separate legal 
personality of the company. However, the limitation to close corporations meant another 
inadequate legislative intervention to deal with the wider corporate structures that could have relied 
on Section 65 of the Close Corporation Act. I will now turn to consider piercing the corporate 









                                                
113 South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, Government Gazette, 
4 No 26493 23 June 2004 at 17. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: PIERCING THE CORPORATE VEIL 
IN TERMS OF THE COMPANIES ACT 2008 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
The Companies Act 2008 introduced a statutory provision that embraced the common law form 
of piercing the corporate veil. Cassim argues this has made ‘inroads’ into the separate legal 
personality of a company because of the first general provision to disregard it in South African 
law.114  As discussed, the Companies Act 1973 proceeded to hold certain parties such as directors 
personally liable.115 The aggrieved litigant was unable unable to rely on statutory law unless the 
application was against a CC. Their claim was based solely on the common law version of veil-
piercing.  
 
The Companies Act 2008 introduced a new statutory provision that permits the court to 
disregard the separate juristic personality available to the company.116 This is an explicit 
opportunity to pierce the corporate veil. Cassim et al explain the importance of the statutory 
piercing of the corporate veil under the Companies Act 2008 as follows,  
‘While previously there had been some legislative provisions in our company law that permitted a 
court to impose personal liability on directors and shareholders in certain instances, we have not 
had in our company law a statutory provision that gives a court general authority to pierce the 
corporate veil’.117 
 
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act was influenced by the aforementioned Section 65 of 
the Close Corporation Act.118 Section 65 was drafted in a manner that the courts could interpret it 
                                                
114 R Cassim, Piercing the Veil under Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: A New Direction, 26 S. Afr. 
Mercantile L.J. 307 (2014) at 307. 
115 See Chapter 4 for discussion on personal liability. 
116 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. 
117 Cassim op cit note 4 at 57. 
118 Ibid. 
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to satisfactorily encompass the range of conduct not incorporated into the personal liability 
provisions of the Companies Act 1973. Section 20(9) of the current Companies Act reads as 
follows:  
“If, on application by an interested person or in any proceedings in which a company is involved, 
a court finds that the incorporation of the company, any use of the company, or any act by or on 
behalf of the company, constitutes an unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of the 
company as a separate entity, the court may—  
(a) declare that the company is to be deemed not to be a juristic person in respect of any 
right, obligation or liability of the company or of a shareholder of the company or, in the 
case of a non-profit company, a member of the company, or of another person specified 
in the declaration; and  
(b) make any further order the court considers appropriate to give effect to a declaration 
contemplated in paragraph (a).” 
 
This section has caused considerable controversy as to its proper application. First, this 
chapter will consider a sound interpretative approach required by the legislature and what has been 
used by the courts. Second, the following relevant subsections of Section 20(9) will be discussed: 
‘interested persons’; ‘unconscionable abuse’; ‘deemed not be a juristic person’; ‘rights, obligations 
or liabilities’; and whether it is a remedy of last resort. Third, I will discuss whether veil-piercing is 
a doctrine or remedy.   
5.2 INTERPRETATION OF SECTION 20(9) 
5.2.1 Interpretation  
The reference to interpretation methods may seem out of place, however, with an issue as unsettled 
as when to pierce the corporate veil there needs to a consideration of the foundational principles 
that will be used to examine the very text. This research is by no means an attempt to provide the 
perfect answer, but helps define with a greater degree of accuracy when to, and when not to, pierce 
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the corporate veil. Section 5 governs how the Companies Act 2008 should be interpreted, which 
must be ‘read holistically together with the rest of the Act, but in particular with the preamble, 
section 6, 7, 158, and 220 and the related notes’.119 Section 5(1) requires ‘a mandatory purposive 
approach to the interpretation of the Act with references to the expressed purposes of the Act as 
set out in section 7’.120  
 
5.2.2 Purposive approach to the Companies Act 2008 
There remains a variety of interpretive mechanisms available but the Companies Act 2008 has, 
with the influence of the Supreme Court of Appeal’s preference for the purposive approach, ‘as 
advanced by the South African Law Reform Commission that reviewed the Interpretation Act 33 
of 1957’.121  Any consideration of the interpretation of the Companies Act 2008, must begin with 
the Constitution.122 Section 39(2) states,  
‘When interpreting any legislation and when developing the common law or customary law, every 
court, tribunal or forum must promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bills of Rights’.123 
 
In Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd, 
Langa DP defined the interpretation of Section 39(2) as ‘the purport and objects of the 
Constitution [that] finds expression in section 1 which lays out the fundamental values which the 
Constitution is designed to achieve’. 124 Section 39(2) of the Constitution requires that the ‘values 
must shine through in the interpretive process’.125 In S v Zuma126, the court confirmed the new 
constitutional dispensation has implemented a departure from a strict rule based interpretation to 
                                                
119 M S Blackman Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) Volume 1 Juta and Co. at 1-36. 
120 Ibid. 
121 Ibid at 1-38. See Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (CCT 27/03) 
[2004] ZACC 15. 
122 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (‘Constitution’). 
123 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
124 and Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 (CC) at para 
22. 
125 B Maswazi, ‘The doctrine of precedent and the value of s 39(2) of the Constitution’, De Rebus April 2017. 
126 and Others 1995(2) SA 642 (CC). 
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a purposive one. This departure encompasses a value-based interpretation in line with the Bill of 
Rights. 
 
The Constitutional Court have ruled the purpose of a statute ‘plays an important role in 
establishing a context that clarifies the scope and intended effect of a law’.127 The purposive 
approach embodies this consideration in its interpretation. The question for any person required 
to interpret the statutory piercing of the corporate veil remains what is the purpose of the 
legislation? Ruth Sullivan notes, 
‘to achieve a sound interpretation of a legislative text, interpreters must identify and take into 
account the purpose of the legislation. Once identified, the purpose is relied on to help establish 
the meaning of the text. It is used as a standard against which proposed interpretations are tested: 
an interpretation that promotes the purpose is preferred over one that does not, while 
interpretations that would tend to defeat the purpose are avoided.’128 
The purposive approach is a directive that ‘the interpreter not only has to read the legislative text 
as a whole, but must also consult all available and relevant internal and external information or 
aids during interpretation’.129  
 
The interpretation of the statute to determine when to pierce the corporate veil further 
entails the consideration of proportionality. Whether the court should pierce the veil is an exercise 
in proportionality and policy considerations. Section 36 of the Constitution is used when the court 
considers when it should limit a constitutional right, in so much that it is ‘reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society’.130 Although this is not a constitutional right, the court must 
determine the rights afforded to the company versus the consequence to limit those in favour of 
                                                
127 Bertie Van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for Safety and Security and Others (CCT 77/08) [2009] ZACC 11 at para 
21. 
128 M S Blackman op cit note 118 at 1-38. 
129 Ibid at 1-38 and 39. 
130 Section 36 of the Constitution. 
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the rights of a party seeking to pierce the corporate veil. In the same vein, the court balances the 
right to determine if it is reasonable and justifiable to make the binary decision pierce the corporate 
veil or not.131  
 
In KPMG Chartered Accountants v Securefin132 the court established that interpretation is a 
matter of law, and not fact. In Natal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality133, Wallis J deems 
interpretation as objective and not subjective. Interpretation is the the process of attributing 
meaning to the words used in a document ‘having regard to the context provided by reading the 
particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a whole and the circumstances 
attendant upon its coming into existence’.134 Consideration must be given to the choice of language 
used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar and syntax; the context in which the provision 
appears; the apparent purpose to which it is directed; and the material known to those responsible 
for its production.135 In the case of ambiguity or more than one meaning possible each possibility 
must be weighed in the light of all these factors. The court must be ‘alert to, and guard against, the 
temptation to substitute what they regard as reasonable, sensible or businesslike for the words 
actually used’.136  
 
Wallis J when referring specifically to legislation argues for a sensible approach that will 
avoid consideration of the ‘the intention of the legislature’ because it is a ‘misnomer’ in so far as it 
connotes that interpretation involves an enquiry into the mind of the legislature.137 The ‘intention 
of the legislature’ is an indication to the court of their role in the process to discern the meaning 
                                                
131 The court has never, and does need to enter into a Section 36 analysis but is a valuable consideration as to what 
may be appropriate consideration in the interplay of rights. Piercing the corporate veil does involve the limitation of 
the rights afforded to the company. The introduction of the Bill of Rights and the value-based interpretation will 
entail the balancing of requisite rights. 
132 (644/07) [2009] ZASCA 7. 




137 Natal Pension Fund supra note 131 at para 20. 
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of the words, and not to impose their own views on the subject matter. The courts process of 
interpretation must ensure the most sensible meaning is preferred so it will not lead to 
‘unbusinesslike results or undermines the apparent purpose of the document’.138 This is confirmed 
by Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs139, in which the Constitutional 
Court  ruled ‘the emerging trend in statutory construction is to have regard to the context in which 
the words occur, even where the words to be construed are clear and unambiguous’. Ultimately, 
the purpose of the provision and context it may appear are important guidance to the correct 
interpretation. 
 
In Gore140 the court notes Section 20(9) is ‘cast in very wide terms’. The court ruled the 
Companies Act 2008 ‘enjoins that its provisions be construed with appropriate regard to 
subsections 5(1) and (2) read with section 7 of the Act (including, to the extent appropriate, a 
consideration of foreign company law)’.141 As discussed, the interpretation of Section 20(9) 
requires a more value-based approach that undertakes to promote promote the spirit, purport and 
objects of the Bills of Rights in line with Section 39(2) of the Constitution.142 There is value in the 
case law prior to the enactment of the Companies Act 2008 for the courts have had many 
opportunities to interpret the context to pierce the corporate veil. Having set out the applicable 
purposive approach to statutory interpretation, I will consider how this approach could be used to 
provide guidance as to the circumstances when the corporate veil should be pierced in terms of 
section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008.  
 
 
                                                
138 Ibid. 
139 2004 (4) SA 490 (CC) at para 90.  
140 Gore supra note 7 at para 32. I will refer to relevant sources of foreign law at chapter 6 in advancing a theory of 
when the corporate veil should be pierced. 
141 Ibid. 
142 Section 39(2) of the Constitution. 
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5.2.3 Piercing the corporate veil in terms of section 20(9) 
 
The Close Corporations Act gave the court discretion to pierce the corporate veil of a close 
corporation when there was ‘gross abuse’ whereas the Companies Act requires ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ to allow the courts to do so.143 This threshold must be satisfied, at which point the court 
must pierce the corporate veil, but it is also the courts’ role to determine as much. However, the 
Companies Act 2008 refers to ‘unconscionable abuse’, with little indication of what conduct may 
be deemed ‘unconscionable’. Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 does not override the 
common law remedy already available in South African Law.144 In Gore145, Binns-Ward J noted that 
Section 20(9) is merely supplemental to the common law, rather than substitutive. The plaintiff 
can choose to base their claim in statute or the common law. The statutory provision has the 
advantage that ‘gives more certainty and visibility to the doctrine of piercing the veil, but a danger 
is that it may result in the doctrine becoming inflexible, particularly if the courts interpret the 
provision in a technical way’.146  
 
The test in Botha requiring ‘unconscionable injustice’ under the common law has been 
rejected by various subsequent court decisions as an unacceptable criterion.147 Section 20(9) has 
codified a seemingly similar requirement of ‘unconscionable’ for when it is appropriate to pierce 
the corporate veil. Unconscionable itself is a descriptive of the proceeding conduct of ‘abuse’ per 
section 20(9), whereas Botha referred to ‘injustice’. The used of the word ‘abuse’ versus ‘injustice’ 
is not a trite difference. Abuse refers to the conduct of the perpetrator, whereas injustice refers to 
the result for the person seeking to pierce the corporate veil. The selection of ‘abuse’ is a very 
telling proposition by the legislature. The courts using the common law veil-piercing jurisprudence 
                                                
143 Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. 
144 The litigant is always given the option to base their claim in statute such as Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 
2008, or may rely on the common law.  
145 Gore supra note 7. 
146 R Cassim ‘Piercing the corporate veil: Unconscionable abuse under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ August 2012 De Rebus 22. 
147 Lubner supra note 38. 
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as to what conduct may be deemed acceptable to pierce the corporate veil focuses more on the 
actions of the perpetrators rather than result on those who seek to pierce the corporate veil.148 The 
court in Hülse-Reutter rejected ‘injustice’, rather that ‘some misuse or abuse of the distinction 
between the corporate entity and those who control it’ must have taken place.149 The legislature 
followed with a similar selection of words used in Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. 
 
5.2.3.1 ‘Interested person’ 
 
Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008 may be relied upon by an ‘interested person’ or by the 
court’s own initiative.150 The courts have the ability of referring to prior case law relating to the 
Close Corporations Act in relation to the similar words used in section 65. In TJ Jonck151 the court 
considered ‘interested person’ for Section 65 of the Close Corporations Act and determined it not 
be interpreted too restrictively, but not too widely that an ‘indirect interest’ would suffice. The 
interest would have to be a financial or monetary one.152  There is a clear commercial value that 
must be placed before the court and indication of a loss. The court in Gore stated there should not 
be ‘any mystique’ attached to the words and not overcomplicate who or what may be deemed an 
‘interested person’.153 The basis for ‘standing of any person to seek a remedy in terms of 
section 20(9) should be determined on the basis of well-established principles and, if the facts 
implicate a right in the Bill of Rights, section 38 (enforcement of rights) of the Constitution’.154 
Thus, this inclusion will be for any person whose human rights, as per the Bill of Rights, may have 
been affected.155  
 
                                                
148 See further chapter 3 of the case law that attempted to determine when to pierce the corporate veil. 
149 Hülse-Reutter supra note 41 at para 20.  
150 MS Blackman op cit note at 2-181 
151 TJ Jonck supra note 99 at 533 – 534. 
152 Ibid at 987. 
153 Gore supra note 7 at para 35. 
154 Ibid. See Jacobs en ’n Ander v Waks en Andere 1992 (1) SA 521 (A) at 533 – 534. 
155 R Mccorquodale and L Page, S Deva, and D Bilchitz, eds. Building a treaty on business and human rights: context and 
contours. Cambridge University Press, 2017 at 230. 
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In Jacobs v Waks156 the court ruled legal standing will be granted for a person with a direct 
interest in that matter to acquire the necessary locus standi. In Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors 
CC v Leshni Rattan157 (‘Four Wheel’), the court ruled the requirements for locus standi are that ‘the 
plaintiff must have an adequate interest in the subject matter of the litigation, usually described as 
a direct interest in the relief sought; the interest must not be too remote; the interest must be 
actual, not abstract or academic; and it must be a current interest and not a hypothetical one’. Four 
Wheel made reference to Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer158 in which the court noted that ‘every 
individual has an interest in every suit that is pending, for he may be placed to-morrow in the 
position of either plaintiff or defendant in a case in which the same principle may be involved’. 
The court is not constituted for purely academic purposes, as such a mere interest will always be 
insufficient if it remains too remote.159 Regrettably, interest has no distinct characteristics and as 
such, in a similar fashion to where the court may pierce the corporate veil, ‘would always depend 
on the particular facts of each individual case, and that no definite rule can be laid down’.160 
Accordingly, the ‘interested person’ requirement in terms of Section 20(9) will be satisfied by well-
established principles of a direct and sufficient interest that is not too remote.  
 
The legislation does not stop at only allowing to pierce the corporate veil upon application 
of an ‘interested person’ either. The legislature has provided a level of autonomy to the court. A 
court is empowered to disregard the separate legal personality of the company mero motu, even 
though the ‘plaintiff or applicant in the matter before it has not requested the court to do so’.161 
By way of example, the court is not obliged to come to the rescue of a litigant and act ex mero motu 
by way of raising a special plea on behalf of a party. The court has been expressly tasked with the 
                                                
156 1992 (1) SA 521 (A) at 533. 
157 NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA) at para 7.  
158 1910 TS 372 at 390. 
159 Ibid. 
160 Jacobs supra note 155 at 534. 
161 R Cassim op cit note 113 at 309. 
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power by the legislature to use Section 20(9) on its own accord. It may not be the courts role to 
do so, however Section 20(9) presents a wide access point in its offering to both a litigant and the 
court to be able to pierce the corporate veil.162  
 
5.2.3.2 ‘Unconscionable abuse’ 
 
Blackman in the Commentary of the Companies Act 2008 notes that ‘unconscionable abuse’ in terms 
of Section 20(9) has not been defined by the Act.163 There is no mention or indication anywhere 
in the Companies Act 2008 of what constitutes unconscionable abuse of the juristic personality of 
the company.164 The wider interpretation of the Companies Act is expressly provided for, ‘in 
interpreting this legislation, it must be interpreted and applied in a manner that gives effect to the 
purposes set out in section 7’.165 Such purposes include what has been discussed, as well as the 
‘promotion of compliance with the Bill of Rights’.166 According to Cassim, ‘unconscionable abuse’ 
of the juristic personality of a company will happen in three ways: (a) on the incorporation of the 
company; (b) as a result of any use of the company as a legal entity; and (c) as a result of any act 
by, or on behalf of, the company.167 
 
The lack of guidance necessitates the interpretational tools discussed in Natal Pension Fund 
and the KPMG cases and examine the literal meaning of the words. A literal interpretation of 
‘unconscionable’ being conduct that is unreasonably excessive.168 Schoeman considers another 
definition of ‘unconscionable’ in the legal context as ‘[u]nusually harsh and shocking to the 
                                                
162 Whether it is good (or bad) to give the court to pierce the corporate veil mero motu is beyond the scope of the 
current paper. 
163 MS Blackman op cit note at 2 -182. 
164 R Cassim op cit note 113 at 316. 
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conscience; that which is so grossly unfair that a court will proscribe it’.169 One of the only pieces 
of legislation to date to define ‘unconscionable’ is the Consumer Protection Act.170 Section 1 
defines it as ‘unethical or improper to a degree that would shock the conscience of a reasonable 
person’.171 Piercing the corporate veil, despite the discretion provided to the courts, must still 
ensure that the standard of ‘unconscionable abuse’ has been satisfied before the ‘interested person’ 
or the courts of its own accord.  
 
The court would ‘only arrive at a finding of personal liability if there were at least a 
conviction that the other party had suffered an unconscionable injustice and that as a consequence 
of something which, to a right-minded person, was clearly improper conduct on the part of the 
person sought to be held liable - mere equity is not sufficient’.172 Smalberger JA in Lubner173 rejected 
‘unconscionable injustice’ for the rigid nature, and ‘opted for a more flexible approach—one that 
allows the facts of each case ultimately to determine whether the piercing of the corporate veil’.  
 
It is submitted Smalberger JA’s assertion that such a standard is rigid. In fact, there is a 
useful consideration in decoding Section 20(9) from Lubner, in which the court stated, 
‘where fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct (and I confine myself to such situations) is 
found to be present … the need to preserve the separate corporate identity would in such 
circumstances have to be balanced against policy considerations which arise in favour of piercing 
the corporate veil’.174  
The courts will always be left with a constant consideration of balancing whether the standard of 
‘unconscionable abuse’ in section 20(9), has been achieved but that is not to say there will not be 
an enquiry into the policy considerations and the consequences of the remedy itself. If 
                                                
169 N Schoeman 'Piercing the corporate veil under the New Companies Act' (2012) De Rebus June 2012. 
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171 Section 1 of the Consumer Protection Act. 
172 MS Blackman op cit note 118 at 2 – 170. 
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‘unconscionable abuse’ is not established, then the court has no legal authority to pierce the 
corporate veil nor consider any policy considerations or use judicial discretion.  
 
‘Unconscionable abuse’ is not a standalone requirement, for the enquiry seeks to create a 
threshold for the court to ensure has been met. This is not to say that a decision to pierce the 
corporate veil is not based solely on whether the, yet to be defined, phrase of ‘unconscionable 
abuse’ threshold is satisfied. Instead of the requirement becoming a binary question that the court 
must answer in the affirmative, there is a balancing requirement, to respect the sanctity of the 
separate legal personality afforded to the company in terms of section 19(1) against the decision 
to pierce the corporate veil.175 The discretion of section 20(9) must be exercised with due regard 
for the consequence of frequent use of the remedy, and taking into account the apprehension to 
use the remedy under the common law and a variety of foreign jurisdictions.176 
 
In Gore, the liquidators of 41 companies permit sought to receive relief ‘to permit certain 
of the assets of those companies to be dealt with as if they were the property of the holding 
company’.177 The relief sought was in line with Section 20(9) as to be deemed not a juristic person, 
the liquidators wanted the chance to ‘selectively disregarding the separate personalities of a number 
of companies in a group of companies and treating their residual assets (that is the assets remaining 
after the payment of the secured creditors and trade creditors of each company) as the assets of 
the holding company for the purposes of settling … investors’ claims’.178 The court confirmed 
allegations that ‘the improprieties had involved the controllers of the companies treating the group 
in a way that had not drawn any proper distinction between the separate personalities of the 
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constituent members, and in using the investors’ funds in a manner inconsistent with what had 
been represented’.179  
 
The controllers conduct amounted to ‘unconscionable abuse’ of the separate legal 
personality by the court. The act of treating each subsidiary and holding company as a single entity 
instead of the due regard for each company, cannot allow for the defence of separate legal 
personality with all the benefits of limited liability attached.  The court failed to take it further, for 
the establishment of the conduct as fraud or fraud-like conduct could provide greater certainty to 
what actions would result in the court being willing to pierce the corporate veil. 
 
The court adopted a very wide interpretation of ‘unconscionable abuse’. The court found 
that Section 20(9) will, 
‘inevitably operate … to erode the foundation of the philosophy that piercing the corporate veil 
should be approached with an a priori diffidence … its unqualified availability … militates against 
an approach that it should be granted only in the absence of any alternative remedy’.180  
Like Lubner, the court further rejected that the common law rule of ‘unconscionable injustice’ from 
Botha for it did not match ‘unconscionable abuse’.  The difference is ‘unconscionable abuse’ relates 
to the conduct giving rise to the remedy of piercing the corporate veil, whereas ‘unconscionable 
injustice’ relates to the consequences of the conduct suffered by the plaintiff.181 The latter refers 
to the requirement that there may be a consequence suffered. If it were left to only consequences 
of the conduct, the court would be more constrained in the amount of times it would be 
empowered to use Section 20(9).  
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The words ‘unconscionable abuse’, according to Gore, not only widened the scope, but 
created a lower ‘standard of abuse than that required for the piercing of the veil of close 
corporations under section 65 of the Close Corporations Act’.182 The court simultaneously rejected 
the stringent requirements of the Close Corporations Act, for these requirements have a much 
‘more extreme connotation’.183 Consideration of the literal meaning of the words combined with 
Gore, veil-piercing has a greater likelihood of success relying on section 20(9) rather than the 
common law.  
 
There can only be speculation as to the discrepancy between the choice of words in the 
Close Corporations Act and the Companies Act 2008. Gore’s decreased standard has itself created 
a risk of a more flexible remedy. Delictual liability case law often prevents the development of 
liability too excessively to ensure the risk of ‘opening the floodgates to litigation’.184 Similarly, 
liability in the company context risks opening the doors to excessive situations of piercing the 
corporate veil at the expense of ensuring the sanctity of the separate legal personality. It is 
submitted, the courts must seek to preserve the separate legal personality through a narrow 
interpretation of unconscionable abuse.  Cassim argues the interpretation of Gore could now make 
it possible for a widen scope of who is established as an ‘interested person’ and for the court to 
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5.1.3.3 ‘Deemed not to be a juristic person’  
 
The essence of separate legal personality as espoused in Salomon to separate the shareholder or 
directors from that of the company remains tantamount to the corporate structure.186 The 
company, that is subject to Section 20(9), will ‘cease to have a separate legal personality in respect 
of certain rights, obligations or liabilities of the company, or of a shareholder of the company or, 
in the case of a non-profit company, a member of the company, or of another person specified in 
the declaration’.187 The consequence is of the utmost severity. The limited liability that may be 
afforded through having a separate legal personality is no longer available to the company. As a 
result, the court is tasked with being the party that will allocate the necessary liability in accordance 
with the actions of the company, and those that were responsible for the conduct. The courts are 
given little direction as to what may be appropriate when such person is deemed to not be a juristic 
person. However, Section 20(9) subsection (a) provides for the allocation of liability, and further 
subsection (b) widens the scope to allow for ‘any further order the court may considers appropriate 
to give effect to a declaration’ of subsection (a) as to the loss of company as a juristic person.188 
This is the codification of what it means to pierce the corporate veil.  
 
5.2.3.4 ‘Rights, obligations or liabilities’ 
 
For the company deemed to not be a juristic person, the to-be discussed ‘unconscionable abuse’ 
must be in ‘respect of particular rights, obligations or liabilities of the company, or of its members 
(in the case of a non-profit company) or shareholders or of another person specified in the 
declaration’.189 The court is limited so as to not be able to intervene even when there may be 
‘unconscionable abuse’ but is not regarding a right, obligation or liability. The provision is allowing 
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the court to act appropriately when there may be abuse. This refers more to a threshold 
requirement of abuse in relation to such ‘right, obligation or liability’, but is very careful not to 
insist on labelling or categorising the type of abuse. Cassim et al provide the example that if ‘a 
company was incorporated for an unlawful purpose, such as lending money above the permitted 
rate in terms of the provisions of the Usury Act 73 of 1968’, but without any loan made to 
someone, the court is not permitted to intervene under the auspices of Section 20(9).190 The 
company structure in the aforementioned example fits the Section 20(9) definition of 
‘unconscionable abuse’, and would require exceptional circumstances to argue otherwise. The 
company has yet to perform an act such as lending above the permitted rate, and thus there has 
been no ‘right, obligation or liability’ that could allow the court to accept an ‘interested persons’ 
reliance on Section 20(9), or to do so of its own accord.  
 
5.2.3.5 No longer a remedy of last resort 
Gore191 becomes the comprehensive authority on the interpretation of yet another aspect of section 
20(9), for Binns-Ward J ruled the remedy will be available despite other potential remedies still 
available to the ‘interested person’ or the court. This interpretation agrees with Lubner, and my 
own submissions that the availability of another remedy will not exclude the veil-piercing doctrine.  
A remedy refers to ‘character and extent of relief’ that may be entitled once ‘appropriate court 
procedure has been followed’.192 It is submitted that even though the court in Hulse-Reutter is 
correct to label it a ‘drastic remedy’, that does not necessitate it must also be used as a remedy of 
last resort. The statutory remedy has no indication it must be a remedy of last resort. Section 20(9) 
when interpreted narrowly must still be used sparingly, as long as the standard has been met, 
despite alternative remedies available. This is further supported by Section 7 to be used to 
encourage the efficient and responsible management of companies 
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The veil-piercing doctrine should not only be relied upon once an exhaustive list of 
alternatives are deemed unavailable.  Instead of using the precedent at common-law of veil-
piercing as a last resort, it need not be. Furthermore, Lubner’s interpretation emphasises ‘the need 
to preserve the company’s separate legal personality’ that must be balanced against those policy 
considerations in favour of piercing the veil’.193 The court noted the availability of another remedy, 
or failure to pursue one, would be a factor to consider in part of policy considerations.194 Unlike 
Amlin, the court in Lubner saw the opportunity of another remedy as no overriding factor but one 
of a variety of factors. In Gore, the court has attempted to distinguish section 20(9) from the 
doctrinal understanding and ruling of the common law version of piercing the corporate veil.  
 
Section 20(9) is a simultaneous opportunity to request the court to pierce the corporate 
veil, but the provision does not exclude the common-law opportunity of veil-piercing. As 
established in Gore, where the requirements of Section 20(9) are not met or cannot be relied upon 
then the common law remedy will still apply for the Act does not override the common law 
instances to pierce the corporate veil.195 Gore remains authority for the statutory provision not 
being a remedy of last resort. If reliance were placed on the common law to pierce the corporate 
veil the court would have the discretion to choose between the contradicting decisions of Lubner 
and Hulse-Reutter.  
 
Foreign law is instructive whether veil-piercing is a remedy of last resort.196 The English 
Supreme Court in Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited197 sought a more conservative approach similar 
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to Hulse-Reutter when ‘all other, more conventional, remedies have proved to be of no assistance’. 
No express mention in the legislation may indicate otherwise, but consideration must be had for 
the global approach piercing the corporate veil. There will be a greater discussion of the Canadian 
approach to piercing the corporate veil, but Shoppers Drug Mart v. 6470360 Canada Inc198 approved 
that to pierce the corporate veil it will have to be exceptional circumstances. It does not preclude 
the availability of another remedy when the court may resort to veil-piercing. Rather than 
approving circumstances that the veil may be pierced, the court has created specific categories to 
do so. Little consideration is used as to whether to pierce the corporate veil as the last resort, rather 
satisfying a criterion is the most important aspect to request a court to do so. Even though it may 
not necessarily be a remedy of last resort in other jurisdictions, there is a general trend of remaining 
conservative in the number of times it may be employed.  
5.3 DOCTRINE OR A REMEDY  
Questions remain as to whether piercing the corporate veil is a doctrine or a remedy. A doctrine 
is a set of fundamental characteristics that ends with specific consequences. Instead the concept 
of piercing the corporate veil can be argued as no doctrine at all but rather as a remedy, for it 
affords an opportunity to achieve discrete, specific policy objectives.199 Piercing the corporate veil 
is a means to achieve a set outcome. As a doctrine it aids in allowing the courts to find an adequate 
remedy for conduct the justifies it being invoked.  
 
To pierce the corporate veil is not the net-end result, rather it provides the avenue for the 
solution, and relates specifically to a solution involving the rights, liabilities or obligations of the 
corporate entity. The idea that the remedy will achieve its objectives is not assisted by the courts 
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inability to provide a set of uniform reasons or standards to apply the remedy of piercing the 
corporate veil. Piercing the corporate veil has been described by Phillip Blumberg as 
‘jurisprudence by metaphor or epithet. It does not contribute to legal understanding because it is 
an intellectual construct, divorced from business realities .... [C]ourts state that the corporate entity 
is to be disregarded because the corporation is, for example, a mere ‘alter ego.’ But they do not 
inform us why this is so, except in very broad terms that provide little general guidance. As a result, 
we are faced with hundreds of decisions that are irreconcilable and not entirely comprehensible. 
Few areas of the law have been so sharply criticized by commentators’.200 
 
Lubner stated that the courts may be justified from disregarding the separate legal 
personality, but without any degree of certainty on which occasions that may occur. 201 The court 
felt it necessary to distinguish each case from another ‘that allows the facts of each case ultimately 
to determine whether the piercing of the corporate veil is called for’.202 There is a level of vagueness 
in the application of the doctrine that goes beyond the South African court system, and it has been 
observed in many jurisdictions.203 Foreign jurisdictions have highlighted that the courts’ need to 
‘avoid an over-rigid preoccupation with questions of structure... and apply the pre-existing and 
overarching principle that liability is imposed to reach an equitable result’.204 The exceptional 
nature of the doctrine has entrenched the near undefeated proposition created from Salomon of 
the protection of the corporate entity. This sanctity has manifested in the ‘exploitation of holding, 
shell and the multiply-layered national and transnational company structures’.205 The doctrine of 
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piercing the corporate veil empowers the court to impose the liability and functions as the avenue 
use to provide a suitable remedy.  
5.4 CONCLUSION 
The introduction of Section 20(9) of the Companies Act enabled a statutory opportunity to pierce 
the corporate veil. The common law jurisprudence as to when to pierce the corporate veil was 
created under the auspices of an incoherent and differing standards set by the case law. There was 
a large variability amongst different courts as to what may constitute ‘unconscionable injustice’, 
whether a remedy of last resort or certain actions will result in invoking the remedy. The statutory 
provision has widened the ambit as to what conduct may result in the court deciding to disregard 
the separate legal personality of the company. Importantly, the courts have been granted greater 
power to pierce the corporate veil and mero motu. The general nature of the provision removes the 
need for the court to engage in the question if an alternative remedy may still exist. What has not 
changed for the courts is the decision to pierce the corporate veil is not something to frequently 
employ. There is juxtaposition between policy considerations to uphold the separate legal 
personality and those that remain in favour of piercing the corporate veil where failure to do so 








CHAPTER SIX: LESSONS FROM CANADIAN 
JURISPRUDENCE 
6.1 INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND 
Both the South African and Canadian law is rooted in English law the reference to the seminal 
Salomon judgment as the basis for the separate legal personality principle of a corporation.206 Statute 
and precedent very clearly ‘posits that the corporate is a separate legal person’.207 The narrative has 
remained the same across many jurisdictions, for the Canadian courts will only deny this to a 
corporation in ‘exceptional’ circumstances.208 Despite their own battles with inconsistency and 
confusing rhetoric, it is submitted that the Canadian courts are more successful than their South 
African counterparts in narrowing down the instances of veil-piercing. Academics have criticised 
the courts handling of the case law, in which ‘there is nothing exceptionally difficult about these 
cases - nothing, that is, besides the confusing rhetoric’.209 The result has been decisions are 
‘impossible to rationalise and that this area of law suffers from a potentially costly lack of 
predictability’.210 
   
The nature of the corporation having separate legal personality provides the mechanism 
in which the company’s shareholders and directors are afforded limited liability. Khimji and 
Nicholls highlight separate legal personality and limited liability remain two distinct concepts that 
must not be used interchangeably.211 Separate legal personality refers to a corporation that itself ‘is 
a person in law, distinct from its shareholders and from anyone else purporting to act for or on 
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behalf of the corporation, such as its directors, officers, employees and other agents’.212 Whereas 
limited liability is that the ‘company and its shareholders are clearly differentiated as distinct legal 
personalities because the debts of the company are separate from the debts of its shareholders’.213 
The veil-piercing doctrine is used to disregard the separate legal personality of the corporation, in 
which the court may impose liability on the shareholders or directors.  
 
The inconsistency of the jurisprudence to veil-piercing has wider ramifications for the 
certainty to the rule of law. Domanski notes the inconsistent reasoning ‘cannot satisfy those who 
believe that a legal system should be built, as far as possible, on a foundation of principle’.214 South 
African and Canadian courts have suffered from an unprincipled approach to achieve the result 
of when it may or may not disregard the separate legal personality of a corporation. In Kosmopoulus 
v Constitution Insurance Co. Of Canada215 (‘Kosmopoulus’), the court confirms Domanski’s statement 
that veil-piercing ‘follows no consistent principle’. Neyers observation of the case law comes to 
the conclusion the courts have done so because ‘the situation demands’ or ‘I feel like it’.216 The 
courts approach has been to ‘employ a kind of kitchen sink approach: citing any number of 
purported veil piercing grounds, with little indication of which among them are determinative’.217 
This dissertation does not look to test the credibility of this, but merely observe the successes and 
failures of both local and international courts to provide a single, coherent and general test to 
pierce the corporate veil that can be used as a blueprint for courts in other jurisdictions.  
 
In this chapter, I will consider what the understanding of separate legal personality 
internationally and establish the lack of clarity is not isolated to South Africa. Following which, 
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rather than widen the ambit of the doctrine, examine the two primary instances the Canadian court 
has established to pierce the corporate veil218: (1) to give effect to statute; and (2) the basis of fraud 
or fraud-like behaviour. The risk of an unprincipled approach to the doctrine has resulted in 
attempts to expand the remedy such as Kosmopoulos  where the court suggested to pierce the 
corporate veil ‘to do justice’219 (known as the ‘just and equitable’ provision), enterprise liability220 
and when a corporation has acted as an agent of its controllers221.  Finally, the remainder of the 
chapter will examine the aforementioned four instances that must be rejected as opportunities to 
pierce the corporate veil. It is further submitted the rejection by the Canadian courts must apply 
in South Africa. 
 
6.2 INTERNATIONAL CORPORATE PERSONALITY  
The true nature of corporate personality ‘has been one of the most troublesome and time-
consuming questions ever pondered by philosophers, sociologists, economists, historians, 
linguists, and jurists’.222 Corporate personality, the nature of a juristic person in the Companies Act 
2008, can be described ‘as though it were a natural person’.223 Corporate personality ‘will have to 
be deconstructed so that the courts will not be misled by oversimplification and thereby corrupt 
Canadian corporate law doctrine’.224 The question of when the courts should pierce the corporate 
veil to disregard the separate legal personality of a corporation has plagued not only local courts, 
but international courts.  
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Like South Africa, neither England nor the United States provide a ‘general test … to 
decide when the veil of incorporation should be lifted’.225 The absence of no general test ‘can be 
attributed to the fact that the courts have invariably relied on certain established categories, such 
as fraud, agency, evasion of legal obligations and abuse of the corporate form, to decide whether 
the veil in a particular case should be lifted vel non’.226 Canadian court jurisprudence on when to 
pierce the corporate veil is no different; it remains radically incoherent.227 The Canadian Supreme 
Court have acknowledged there remains ‘no consistent principle’ in common amongst the cases 
when the veil has been pierced.228  
6.3 RELEVANT CANADIAN PRINCIPLES  
Whereas South Africa looks to the unfair advantage gained by the corporation or those who 
control it, the Canadian Law has two distinguished principles of ‘improper purpose’ and ‘control’.  
 
6.3.1 Improper Purpose 
 
Despite the frequent references to Salomon, the Canadian courts have developed principles that 
could result in piercing the corporate veil at the expense of the separate legal personality of the 
corporation. The earlier grounds, or ‘categories’, to justify piercing the corporate veil were ‘agency 
and use of the corporate structure for an improper purpose’.229 There remains a similarity with the 
jurisprudence developed by the South African courts in Botha requiring ‘unconscionable injustice’.230 
Although this standard was later rejected. A case similar to Canadian courts, the court in Lubner 
indicated presence of any ‘fraud, dishonesty or other improper conduct’ shows a high indication to 
pierce the corporate veil.231  
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The Canadian courts’ determination of what may be an ‘improper purpose’ has no 
consistency as to the rhetoric used or standard. Terms such as ‘sham’, ‘facade concealing the true 
facts’ and ‘conduct akin to fraud’ have been used, and once met such standard will invoke the 
opportunity to disregard the separate legal personality.232 These standards are no more than 
multiple attempts to find descriptive rhetoric to what may be improper purpose. This has done 
little to clarify when a future court may decide the necessary standard has been met. In tandem, 
there has been a creation of categories of ‘improper purpose’, including inter alia, ‘use of the 
corporation to avoid a pre-existing legal obligation; thin or inadequate corporate capitalization; 
and failure to observe proper corporate formalities’.233 Each of these have been criticised for each 
creates a sliding scale of the degree of impropriety.  
 
6.3.2 Control  
 
Again, as established by the South African courts, without fitting into these categories requires 
reverting to the broad notion of individual courts’ vague definition of ‘improper purpose’. This 
has been confirmed by the failure to have a uniform ‘statement on the precise relevance or content 
of the standards to be applied in determining the requisite degree of control and impropriety to 
justify veil piercing’.234 In Transamerica Life Insurance Co of Canada v Canada Life Assurance Co 
(‘Transamerica’) 235 the court combined control and impropriety as the necessary elements to pierce 
the corporate veil. The court stated it ‘will disregard the separate legal personality of a corporate 
entity where it is completely dominated, controlled, and being used as a shield for fraudulent or 
improper conduct’.236 Rather than a binary requirement of having either control or improper 
conduct, the court suggested it necessary to have both present.  
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As Khimji and Nicholls note, having such vague standards of control and improper 
conduct would imply ‘to justify veil piercing would appear to have been satisfied by the facts in 
Salomon itself’.237 The jurisprudence has come full circle by basing the sanctity of the separate legal 
personality of a corporation in Salomon. The courts variable standard to pierce the corporate veil 
that if the facts of Salomon were presented before a Canadian court in future it may render a different 
result. It could be argued that the precedent in Transamerica should justify the court to pierce the 
corporate veil and impose liability on the shareholder or director in the similar position as 
Salomon.  
6.4 ESTABLISHED INSTANCES TO PIERCE THE CORPORATE VEIL 
Unlike in South Africa, the Canadian courts have two established categories of veil piercing: When 
statute gives directive to pierce the corporate veil and in the presence of fraud or fraudulent 
activity.  
6.4.1 Statutory directive to pierce the corporate veil  
Courts have pierced the corporate veil pursuant to the application of a statute.238 Legislators have 
made it available to ‘render persons liable for actions that under the regime of private law would 
be unactionable’ often for public policy reasons.239 Section 119(1) of the  Canadian Business 
Corporation Act240 imposes liability, jointly and severally, on directors of a corporation for up to 
six months to each employee for services rendered. The legislator has the requisite power ‘to 
instruct the courts to ignore, reinterpret, or render unenforceable the legal relations and contracts 
(nominate or otherwise) that natural persons have in fact constructed’.241 The legislators do not 
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‘demand that courts ignore all the conceptions and principles that are at the root of company 
law’.242 Neyers notes this is an alteration of a corporate contract in pursuit of a public policy 
objective.243 The ability to pierce the corporate veil pursuant to stature is not only justified, but 
based in statute helps to clarify a clear category to do so. The following cases illustrate the courts’ 
use of statute to pierce the corporate veil and provide a satisfactory remedy based on a statutory 
provision. The Canadian courts have an incoherent approach but have developed certain rules that 
have also found success in South Africa. 
 
6.4.1.1 Income Tax Act 
Although not always possible, statute provides a better guideline for the conduct required of the 
corporation and what is deemed to be in contravention of the impugned provision. Statute is 
written down and clearly codified, where as the common law exists through various court 
decisions. 244 
 
For example, the Income Tax Act (Canada)245 was brought before the court in De Salaberry 
Realties Ltd. v. M.NR.246 (‘De Salaberry’) to determine if the sale of land should be regarded as a 
‘capital gain’ or ‘income’. If found to be a ‘capital gain’ there would be a substantial tax saving. The 
case involved a ‘large network of parent and subsidiary corporations which were all beneficiary 
owned by two families’.247 The corporations were said to be in the business of the development of 
shopping complexes. The evidence itself pointed to a subsidiary of the parent corporation that 
‘has only been incorporated to make one or a few purchases of land, and that the land was almost 
always sold at a profit shortly after purchase’.248 There is nothing untoward about the sale of land, 
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but the business of the corporations was not the sale of land, rather the development of shopping 
complexes. The corporation argued that because they were not in the business of the sale and 
purchase of land, the profits should only be taxed as ‘capital gains’ and not ‘income’.249  
 
The respondent argued that if the court considered the subsidiaries as a single economic 
unit, the ‘aggregate of subsidiaries was in involved in the purchase and sale of property on a 
commercial scale’.250 The Federal Court of Appeal disregarded the separate legal personality of 
each individual subsidiary, and the group of companies was treated ‘as a single economic unit’ for 
tax purposes.251 The court found that the sale of land by the subsidiary was inventory, and fell 
under the auspices of ‘income’.252 Stephenson et al identify the public policy considerations of 
‘Parliament’s intention’ in the Income Tax Act to tax business proceeds at a higher rate than those 
of capital dispositions.253 Neyers criticism of the rhetoric and reason of the courts is exemplified 
in this decision. The court established the course of conduct was that of the subsidiary is involved 
in the purchase and sale of land. However, the court ‘went on for pages justifying his piercing of 
the corporate veil on other tax and statutory cases which spoke of the lack of separate will or 
agency of the subsidiary’.254 As Stephenson et al argue the veil was pierced pursuant to the statute. 
Although, the court’s extensive discussion on the parent-subsidiary relationship has brought the 
debate to whether there is principles of when to pierce the corporate veil in such relationships.255 
The choice to include statute, veil piercing and parent-subsidiary relationships makes it difficult to 
deduce whether the decision to pierce the corporate veil was pursuant to statute and the parent-
subsidiary relationship, or just pursuant to statute.   
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As established in Gore, the liquidators requested similar relief to ‘permit certain of the assets 
of those companies to be dealt with as if they were the property of the holding company’.256 
Although the respondents and court in De Salaberry sought to create hold the subsidiaries and 
parent as one economic unit for the purposes of tax, the justification to pierce the corporate veil 
for the group of companies parallels Gore. The similarities do not end there, the courts in both 
instances referred to the foundational principles of separate legal personality in Salomon.257 In fact, 
Gore and Kosmopoulos reiterate the importance of the principle in Salomon to be abided by as far as 
possible. However, ‘the best that can be said is that the separate entities principle is not enforced 
when it would yield a result too flagrantly opposed to justice, convenience or the interests of the 
Revenue’.258 The result is the principle of separate legal personality in Salomon will be abided by in 
the Canadian Courts as far as possible, and it is unlikely they will depart from this ‘sacred doctrine’ 
for cases of enterprise liability, except for tax cases.259  
 
The apparent reluctance of the courts to pierce the corporate veil has been relaxed in 
relation to tax matters. Especially where there is a possibility of a tax evasion scheme.260 There 
remains a thin line between tax avoidance and tax evasion. The former is legal and allows for 
persons or corporations to reduce tax payable, the latter is illegal. Like the structure of the 
corporations in De Salaberry, ‘one of the most common forms of tax evasion schemes occurs when 
the parties that have entered into a contract attempt to disguise the true nature of their dealings in 
order to claim a tax benefit’.261 Section 80(1) of the Income Tax Act(Canada) permits the 
commissioner to consider the substance rather than the form of the transaction.262 This is a parallel 
to the common law principles of the courts’ decision to pierce the corporate veil in South Africa 
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who are entitled to look to substance rather than form’.263 As Potter et al note this is ‘doctrinally 
satisfying because they disclose some positive, jurisdictional grounds on which to pierce the corporate 
veil, namely to give effect to countervailing legislative enactments’.264 The South African Revenue 
Service (SARS) investigate tax returns to distinguish between tax avoidance and evasion. Various tax 
cases such as ERF 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) and Another v CIR265 the application of the Income Tax 
Act266 of South Africa, particularly Section 103 relating to anti-avoidance, allowed the court to 
disregard the separate legal personality of the subsidiary. The court ensured the Commissioner of 
Inland Revenue could claim the requisite tax revenue and reveal the disguised transactions of the 
dormant subsidiary company and parent company.267 
 
6.4.1.2 Divorce Act  
 
To give effect to statute has allowed for the courts to pierce the corporate veil in the realm of 
family law. In the case of Wildman v Wildman268, the appellant husband and applicant wife had 
separated in 2003. Despite the many support orders made against the appellant, the court was of 
the opinion there was a continued lack of intention to oblige and evade the monetary obligations 
of over $800 000.269 Rather than contest the amount owed, Macpherson JA of the court found ‘the 
appellant challenges not one penny of this amount’.270 The court found justification,  inter alia, to 
disregard the separate legal personality where the corporation ‘is completely dominated and 
controlled and being used as a shield for improper conduct’271 and pursuant to statute under the 
Child Support Guidelines.272 The Child Support Guidelines empower the court to ‘consider the income 
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of corporations in determining a spouse’s true income’.273 The court ruled the intention of the 
provision is ‘to enable the courts to conduct a fair accounting of the money available for the 
payment of child support’.274 The preceding paragraph stated the Child Support Guidelines 
‘contemplates piercing the corporate veil in appropriate cases’.275 It was common cause that the 
appellant owed the money. The appellant was using a corporation specifically to hide their true 
income and avoid the payments. The court used the doctrine of veil-piercing empowered through 
statute to reveal the true state affairs.  
 
6.4.1.3 Summary of the principles to veil-piercing pursuant to statute  
 
Despite the criticism levelled at the court in De Salaberry, there is a distinct category deduced when 
to pierce the corporate veil. De Salaberry and Wildman are just two examples of the courts approval 
to pierce the corporate veil pursuant to an explicit statutory provision.276 To pierce the corporate 
veil pursuant to statute has still resulted in the courts providing narrative and justification through 
a variety of vague principles such as control, parent-subsidiary relationships and impropriety. 
Instead of entertaining the vagueness of this rhetoric, what can be summarily noted from the case 
law is that this is a valid category to allow for the courts to pierce the corporate veil. Consequently, 
these cases must not be used as ‘setting out principles of general application’ to the wider veil-
piercing doctrine.277 Potter et al point to Gonthier J. in Conseil de la Santé (Montréal)  v. City of 
Montreal278 in the context of two corporations for tax purposes:  
‘giving substance precedence over form and considering two separate corporate entities as one and 
the same person when this is consistent with the wording and purpose of the statute in question’. 
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276 See similar case of Debora v Debora 2006 CanLII 40663 (ON C.A.). 
277 K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson op cit note 26 at 561. 
278 (1994) 3 S.C.R. 29 (S.C.C.) at para 46; K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson op cit note 26 at 561. 
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The decision to pierce the corporate veil is based solely on the statute and the power given 
to courts by the legislature. The additional discussion by the courts in their judgments of what may 
also be relevant considerations have blurred that to pierce the corporate veil pursuant to statute is 
itself a standalone category. This dissertation has highlighted the danger of categorisation, but this 
is an acceptable solution when there remains a statutory basis for veil-piercing. Scholars even argue 
that rather than citing these cases as veil-piercing, this is just a form of statutory interpretation.279 
Even if this were accepted as truth, the result is the same as implementing the doctrine to pierce 
the corporate veil. The biggest issue the courts have created in the jurisprudence is looking to use 
a variety of principles in their justification to veil-piercing pursuant to statute.280  
6.4.2 Fraud exception   
6.4.2.1 Introduction  
The court will pierce the corporate veil for fraud-based grounds when ‘the corporation is 
dominated by the shareholders and is being used as a shield for fraudulent or fraud-like conduct’.281 
The maxim ‘Fraud unravels everything’ has been cited in many jurisdictions.282 The presence of 
fraud is not ‘full-blown fraud’, rather ‘whether the corporation has been used in a manner that 
strikes the court as improper, which introduces a great deal of uncertainty into the fraud 
exception’.283 The words of Cameron JA in Absa Bank Ltd v Moore284 provides guidance for this 
maxim:  
‘The maxim is not a flame-thrower, withering all within reach. Fraud unravels all directly within its 
compass, but only between victim and perpetrator, at the instance of the victim. Whether fraud 
unravels a contract depends on the victim, not the fraudster or third parties.’ 
The fraud-exception must not be used beyond the scope of the fraudulent activity to disregard the 
entire separate legal personality of the corporation for anything that does not encompass the fraud. 
                                                
279 JW Neyers op cit note 206 at 219. 
280 This will be discussed further under Chapter 6.8 ‘Floodgates to pierce the corporate veil’, but this has lead to 
attempts by ambitious litigants to rely on enterprise liability discussed in De Salaberry, agency and when it is deemed 
‘just and equitable’.  
281 K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson op cit note 206 at 563.  
282 Per Lord Denning in Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB (CA) at 712. See further Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Rand 
Merchant Bank & another v Master of the High Court, Cape Town & others [2013] ZAWCHC 173 (11 November 2013) paras 
20-27. 
283 K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson op cit note 26 at 564. 
284 2017 (1) SA 255 (CC) at para 39.  
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This ensures the doctrine is an exceptional remedy, while still protecting the principles of separate 
legal personality and limited liability. The South African courts have not required the presence of 
fraud, rather it has been used as an indicator, for which the courts may engage in an a secondary 
enquiry of a balancing approach that ‘requires the concept of separate legal personality being weighed 
against those principles and policies in favour of piercing the veil’.285 
 
6.4.2.2 Dominance and fraudulent conduct  
The apprehension to label the statutory veil-piercing as a category is well-founded, but there is 
sound logic when it does not use principles such as fraud-based grounds. In Transamerica, the court 
determined both dominance and fraud was required:  
‘The courts will disregard the separate legal personality of a corporate entity where it is completely 
dominated and controlled and being used as a shield for fraudulent or improper conduct’.286 
 The court went further to define what would satisfy each element: First, on the element of 
dominance, the court stated,  
‘complete control, requires more than ownership. It must be shown that there is a complete 
domination and that the subsidiary company does not, in fact, function independently’.287  
Second, on the nature of the conduct, the question is whether there is:  
‘conduct akin to fraud that would otherwise unjustly deprive claimants on their rights?’288  
The second enquiry of fraud is the umbrella term that is satisfied when ‘the company is incorporated 
for an illegal, fraudulent or improper purpose. But it can also be pierced if when incorporated those 
in control expressly direct a wrongful thing to be done’.289  
 
6.4.2.3 What is fraud? 
For the courts to consider what constitutes fraud, the following has been determined as acceptable 
use of the corporate form:  
                                                
285 M Henkeman op cit note 68. 
286 Transamerica supra note 234 at para 22.  
287 Ibid.  
288 Ibid at para 23.  
289 642947 Ontario Ltd. v. Fleischer, 2001 CanLII 8623 (ON CA) at para 68.  
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‘(i) taking advantage of limited shareholder liability; (ii) having only one shareholder who exercises 
control over the corporation, and (iii) failing to pay the corporation’s debts.’290 
The courts have been known to cite shareholder domination as ‘improper conduct’.  but as Potter 
et al establish this is merely a threshold requirement for the first enquiry.291 The incoherence of 
the doctrine can be seen in the courts justification to pierce the corporate veil through the two-
step enquiry. The courts have selected elements relevant only for the first-stage enquiry of control 
to justify the second-stage enquiry of conduct akin to fraud. It has been argued that a numerous 
clausus approach to veil-piercing sets a dangerous precedent. The risk of conduct being determined 
in this way has allowed judicial discretion to rule what may be improper purpose, and on the other 
side allowed conduct that may be ‘akin to fraud’ not fitting any pre-determined definition. The 
South African courts have fallen victim in being too determined on a case-by-case basis of veil-
piercing without any direction.  
 
Potter et al identify factors, similar to those in Worldwide Carriers, Lt v. Aris Steamship Co.292  
in which the courts should consider on, the second enquiry of what constitutes fraud:  
‘(i) thin capitalisation; (ii) failure to observe corporate formalities; (iii) a shareholder treating the 
corporation’s property as if it were his or her own without regard to the directors to act in his or 
her sole interest without regard to the interests of the corporation or its shareholders; and (v) 
timing incorporation to avoid pre-existing obligations’.293 
This is not a closed list, but are the most likely factors to consider that may be relevant to determine 
what may constitute fraud. Although fraud is a category, the identity of fraud must still be 
established. These factors are noted as the most likely to be present in the instances of fraud. 
Having the rigidity of a fraud category provides a level of certainty, but the factors being flexible 
                                                
290 K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson op cit note 26 at 565. 
291 Ibid.  
292 301 F.Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y., 1968) at para 7.  
293 K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson op cit note 26 at 565. 
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allows for the courts to continuously have the power to consider any factor that could be deemed 
fraudulent.  
 
6.4.2.4 Application of the principles to Salomon v Salomon 
 
To test the aforementioned two elements, it is a worthwhile exercise to see if Salomon, would pass 
muster. Judges have lined up to criticise the rhetoric of the courts who cite the Salomon principle 
but then do an about-turn and disregard the separate legal personality in the same judgment. On 
the first enquiry, although there was not parent-subsidiary relationship, like the appellant in 
Wildman, Aron Salomon was the sole shareholder, in which the court ‘legitimated the one-man 
company’.294  
 
It is clear that Salomon held the requisite complete control. The decision in Salomon 
legitimised ‘the concept of the one person or private company’ as the company was used as a 
conduit for his own personal business dealings.295 On the second enquiry of fraud the company 
was validly formed and registered, and in its own right a legal person.296 Thus, what Salomon did 
‘was perfectly justified on the basis of the law. There was no fraud or misrepresentation. Nobody 
was deceived’.297 In the English Court of Appeal, the lower court, Lord Linley saw Salomon’s use 
of incorporation as a ‘device to defraud creditors’.298 Had the House of Lord been satisfied of the 
presence of fraud we can only assume the decision of the English Court of Appeal would have 
been upheld. Having passed the muster of the two elements of the Transamerica case, the court 
would be able to pierce the corporate veil and rule accordingly against Aron Salomon. However, 
                                                
294 Cassim et al op cit note 4 at 34.  
295 P Lipton "The mythology of Salomon's case and the law dealing with the tort liabilities of corporate groups: an 
historical perspective." Monash UL Rev. 40 (2014) at 453. 
296 Cassim et al op cit note 4  at 33. See further Chapter 2. 
297 J. H. Farrar, Fraud, Fairness and Piercing the Corporate Veil, 16 Can. Bus. L.J. 474 (1990) at 476.  
298 Broderip v Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch 323 at 339 (CA). 
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the House of Lords did not agree, and if we were to consider the factors of Worldwide Carriers, Lt 
v. Aris Steamship Co, the second-enquiry of fraud would not and cannot be met.  
6.5 GROUNDS TO REJECT VEIL-PIERCING  
Having established the two instances that allow for veil-piercing, there has been attempts to extend 
the remedy beyond this narrow scope through agency, the ‘just and equitable’ exception and 
enterprise liability. Agency will be argued as a completely different aspect of law, and the final 
three have been rejected by the courts’ for interpreting the doctrine too broadly. 
 
6.5.1 Agency 
The earlier grounds to pierce the corporate veil were improper purpose and agency.299 Agency 
refers to when the corporation ‘has acted as the agent of its controllers’.300 As established by 
Blackman,  imposing liability on directors is not by way of the contracts they may enter into on 
behalf of the company for they are agents of the company.301 Khimji and Nicholls argue ‘agency’ 
has been well documented in the case law:  
‘it is rarely clear whether courts have in mind the legally well-defined principal-agent relationship. 
Instead, they appear to use the word as a layperson might, adverting to some significant but ill-
defined degree of control exercised by a shareholder over a corporation, prompting the court to 
denounce the corporate body as merely the shareholder's alias or alter ego-entirely undeserving of 
the status of a separate legal person’.302  
As Potter et al note, to request for the veil to be pierced makes no sense.303 The plaintiff ‘who 
argues that a corporation is an agent necessarily concedes that the corporation exists at law as a 
                                                
299 See Palmolive Manufacturing Co (Ontario) v R, [1933] SCR 131 at 140, [1933] 2 DLR 81 
300 K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson op cit note 26 at 574.  
301 MS Blackman op cit note 118 at 2 – 178. 
302 M Khimji & C. Nicholls op cit note 205 at 216.  
303 K Potter, V Maric & M Stephenson op cit note 26 at 574. 
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separate entity which is capable of being bound in contract’.304 The notion of contract purports 
that the corporation exists with the requisite rights attached to a juristic person. The agency 
relationship is governed by the rules of agency law, a separate and distinct area of law that has no 
relationship to veil-piercing.305 Thus, if the plaintiff is able to prove via the laws of agency that the 
corporation is acting on behalf of another the remedies are available according to the law of agency, 
rather than veil piercing. The attempts to use the veil-piercing doctrine are incorrect in law. Not 
only does it not comply with the two-stage enquiry of the established category of fraud but have 
further implications of failing to develop the laws of agency.  
 
6.5.2 ‘Just and equitable’ exception  
Plaintiffs have approached the courts to pierce the corporate veil ‘when it is in the interests of 
justice’.306 Some courts have obliged to reach a ‘just’ or ‘equitable’ result by using an ‘amalgam of 
broadly worded veil-piercing, agency, and group enterprise theory to justify their more 
comprehensive statutory interpretations’.307 When statute allows for veil-piercing there is no 
secondary enquiry whether it is just and equitable. This line of reasoning amalgamates veil-piercing 
pursuant to statute with an ancillary concept of ‘in the interests of justice’. In Kosmopoulos, Wilson 
J opened the opportunity to the just and equitable principle to do justice, ‘the separate entities 
principle is not enforced when it would yield a result too fragrantly opposed to justice, convenience 
or the interests of the Revenue’.308 Although the courts have looked to reach a just result such as 
in statutory interpretation, there has been a refusal to establish a ‘free-standing just and equitable 
exception to the twin principles’ of separate legal personality and limited liability.309 To receive a 
                                                
304 Ibid.  
305 See further Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC); Maye Serobe (Pty) Ltd v Lewusa Obo Members and Others 
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just result is a separate issue to the attempted to use the just and equitable principle to pierce the 
corporate veil.  
 
In Lynch v Segal310 (‘Lynch’), in similar vein to Transamerica, the court proposed ‘there is a line 
of jurisprudence establishing in very general terms that the courts will not enforce the separate 
entities notion where it would yield a result too flagrantly opposed to justice, convenience or the 
interests of the Revenue’.311 The issue in obtaining a just result has led to the courts amalgamating 
various principles and creating the opportunity of veil-piercing based solely on just and equity. The 
operation of a ‘just and equity’ exception would risk inroads into the principle of separate legal 
personality in instances a court would look to achieve a certain result through the veil-piercing 
remedy. The court relied on decisions such as Transamerica, in which the courts refused to pierce 
the corporate veil when opposed to justice.312 Transamerica was explicit that to disregard the separate 
legal personality of the corporation must not be taken lightly, and inter alia, there must be ‘conduct 
akin to fraud that would otherwise unjustly deprive claimants of their rights’.313  
 
In Lynch, the court found no instances of fraud or conduct akin to fraud, rather resorting 
to citing cases rejecting veil-piercing and determining a more ‘flexible approach is appropriate in 
the family law context’.314 The result of enforcing spousal and child support payments may be just 
and equitable, but the use of the standalone provision explicitly rejected by the Supreme Court of 
Canada sets the dangerous precedent of allowing litigants to use the principle. Subsequent cases 
have confirmed Kosmopoulos ‘did not meant that the courts enjoy “carte blanche”’ approach to veil-
piercing on a just and equitable standard.315  
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This debate has been laid to rest in Yaiguaje v Chevron Corporation316. The majority relied on 
Sun Indalex Finance v United Steelworkers317 for no standalone provision when it is ‘just and equitable’, 
and to advance the law it must ‘evolve on a principled basis and in a manner that brings certainty 
and clarity, not in a way that sows confusion and is devoid of principle’.318 Despite the minority 
written by Nordheimer J arguing the court has the power to pierce the corporate veil based on its 
equitable jurisdiction, the decision remains clear no such ground exists.319 
 
6.5.4 Enterprise liability  
6.7.4.1 Introduction  
As the courts have referred to corporations as a ‘single economic unit’, the theory proposes ‘each 
constituent corporation is liable for the actions of each of its related corporations’.320 In Mull v. 
Colt321 the court held: 
‘If plaintiff can show that there was such a unity of interest and ownership that the independence 
of the corporations had in effect ceased or had never begun, an adherence to the fiction of separate 
identity would serve only to defeat justice and equity by permitting the economic entity to escape 
liability arising out of an operation conducted by one corporation for the benefit of the whole 
enterprise.’ 
The above refers to the instrumentality doctrine, with the only difference to the enterprise doctrine 
being on functionality and not ownership of capital.322 The test of enterprise liability would only 
differ with the ownership of capital requirement met.  
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6.5.4.2 Yaiguaje v Chevron Corporation 
In Chevron, the plaintiffs from the Lago Agrio region in Ecuador approached the Ontario Superior 
Court to enforce the US$9.5 billion judgment made in the Ecuadorian.323 The plaintiffs argued the 
should be able to enforce a judgment on Chevron by way of its various subsidiaries.324 The court 
rejected the plaintiff’s claim of imposing liability on the Canadian Chevron subsidiary on two 
counts: enterprise liability does not form part of Canadian law, and does not comply with ‘the 
relevant business statutes’ such as the CBCA.325 The court noted that, 
‘corporate separateness is much more nuanced among a group of related corporations… The 
CBCA permits subsidiary corporations but also says that each corporation is a natural person. If 
Parliament wished to carve out an exception to the natural person rule of subsidiaries, it would 
have been very easy to do so’.326 
The ability to allow for enterprise liability has the potential to open the floodgates to litigants to 
select a jurisdiction where there is a subsidiary corporation with more favourable laws. In 2011 
Chevron operated in 23 countries through the incorporation of 72 subsidiaries in 24 separate 
jurisdictions.327 If Canadian law were to recognise enterprise liability, any subsidiary of a 
corporation with a judgment in another jurisdiction could be at risk.   
 
Rapid global development has resulted in ‘governance gaps created by globalization - 
between the scope and impact of economic forces and actors, and the capacity of societies to 
manage their adverse consequences’.328 Consequently, a different country has been required to rule 
on actions or activities that have taken place in another.  Condon questions if enterprise liability 
should be part of the law: 
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‘However useful it is as a doctrine of corporate law, is it right that the idea of a "corporate veil" be 
used in 2012 to block the claims, for example, of Latin American villagers seeking compensation 
for the destruction of their environment by tailings from a Canadian owned mine? Why should the 
cost of the environmental devastation fall entirely on the heads of its victims? Why shouldn't legal 
responsibility follow the money up the corporate food chain?’329 
Nordheimer JA, who purported to justify the need for a ‘just and equitable’ principle, held it should 
be possible to enforce the judgment in the Ecuadorian courts against Chevron Canada.330 His 
reasoning was that ‘Chevron Canada is an asset of the Chevron Corporation’, and ‘it is ultimately 
controlled, for all practical purposes, by the Chevron Corporation’.331 Despite the noble attempts 
to widen the doctrine for ‘enterprise liability’ and ‘just and equity’, the majority ruled explicitly that 
neither forms part of Canadian jurisprudence.  
6.6 CONCLUSION  
The test to pierce the corporate veil has been famously described by Cardozo J as ‘enveloped in 
the mists of metaphor’.332 The rhetoric and overlapping of (ir)relevant principles has prevented a 
congruent development of veil-piercing jurisprudence. The attempts by litigants to expand the 
doctrine has been entertained such as Nordheimer JA in Chevron. The incoherence of veil-piercing 
has not been limited to South Africa or Canada, but poses the risk of a cross-jurisdictional 
nightmare. In Amlin, the court described the doctrine’s use only in ‘exceptional circumstances’.333 
The Canadian courts have made a clear distinction of relevant categories to pierce the corporate 
veil: it can be done when it is pursuant to statute and to prevent the corporation as a shield for 
fraud. Any further attempt to pierce the corporate veil outside this must continue to be rejected.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Piercing the corporate veil has been labelled as the ‘veil of confusion’334 and ‘shrouded in 
misperception’335. This dissertation has examined the South African courts approach to pierce the 
corporate veil originating in the common law through the statutes to the current general provision 
of Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 2008. The courts have made considerable effort to provide 
a satisfactory framework for when to pierce the corporate veil. We are still left without the 
necessary clarity as to what may be deemed an acceptable working definition of the conduct that 
would justify the veil-piercing doctrine in South Africa.  
 
The common law jurisprudence that has been examined indicates the circumstances ‘in 
which a court would pierce the veil are far from settled and much depends on a close analysis of 
the facts of each case, considerations of policy and judicial judgment’.336 The codification of the 
piercing the corporate veil doctrine through Section 20(9) is a welcome addition to the 
jurisprudence. Circumstances that would justify piercing the corporate veil in terms of Section 
20(9) have lingered from the common law in which the doctrine remains a flexible and its use 
determined according to the facts of the case. A departure from the common law by way of section 
20(9) has been that although the remedy should still be used in exceptional circumstances, there is 
a seemingly lower threshold of conduct required. Further, section 20(9) has established there isno 
restriction on the remedy being used only as a last resort. This has provided an aggrieved litigant 
or the court to employ the remedy despite alternative remedies being available.   
 
South African courts are not the only ones who have failed to establish the concept of 
when to pierce the corporate veil with the necessary degree of certainty required. This dissertation 
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has highlighted the incoherence of the Canadian jurisprudence that has also tended to amalgamate 
different legal concepts and not standardising a framework for veil-piercing. Despite this criticism, 
there has been the emergence of two distinct categories to pierce the corporate veil in Canadian 
courts: (1) pursuant to statute; and (2) in the presence of fraud or fraud-like conduct. Despite 
attempts to widen the scope beyond these two established instances, the courts have stood firm 
to reject inroads into the separate legal personality and limited liability of the corporation.   
 
The court should look beyond the scope of the South African jurisprudence, as established 
in Chapter 5, the court in Gore337 noted Section 20(9) is ‘cast in very wide terms’ and the Act 
‘enjoins that its provisions be construed with appropriate regard to subsections 5(1) and (2) read 
with section 7 of the Act (including, to the extent appropriate, a consideration of foreign company 
law)’. This is further entrenched by Section 39(1) of the Constitution that empowers the court to 
consider foreign law. The established clarity the Canadian courts have brought to the veil-piercing 
doctrine is noteworthy. It is submitted this will could be used to have two major contributions to 
piercing the corporate veil in South Africa.  
 
A consequence of the flexible approach in South Africa, in some cases intentionally and 
others less so, has been the rejection of any form of categorisation of conduct that would 
automatically justify the use of the remedy. The comparison with Canadian law has revealed the 
South African courts have inadvertently used the two established categories of the Canadian law:  
(1) pursuant to statute; and (2) in the presence of fraud or fraud-like conduct. The courts have not 
explicitly embraced this through the judgments, rather looking to revert to the facts of the case, 
policy considerations and judicial discretion as justification. Rather than reject the concept of 
categorisation, South Africa should embrace the use of the categories used in jurisdictions such as 
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Canada. Listed prohibited conduct that imposed personal liability under the Companies Act 1973 
was not a form of veil-piercing, and did not cater to the two categories of veil piercing that have 
found success in Canada. However, what Canada has done successfully is ensure that there is not 
list of conduct, only established principles to determine when to pierce the corporate veil. This 
has positive ramifications for ensuring the tenets of separate legal personality and limited liability 
in accordance with Section 7 of the Companies Act 2008 by ‘encouraging entrepreneurship and 
enterprise efficiency’ remains intact. Piercing the corporate veil is, and remains, a drastic remedy 
that requires balancing corporate separateness against the conduct that justifies disregarding it.  
 
This dissertation has revealed the effective use of the Canadian law categorisation in South 
Africa. The recommendations are as follows:  Firstly, rather than the courts maintaining veil-
piercing as a flexible remedy, Section 20(9) should be interpreted narrowly in accordance with the 
principles deduced from Transamerica when ‘completely dominated and controlled and being used 
as a shield for fraudulent or improper conduct’.338 Secondly, it is permissible to pierce the corporate 
veil when pursuant to statute. Instead of including rhetoric used by the courts such as in the 
‘interests of justice’, if statute itself permits there is no need to find additional reason to do so. 
This risks interpreting piercing the corporate veil at both common law and the Companies Act 
2008 too widely to ensure conduct covered by statute such as the Income Tax Act may be 
encompassed.339 The result is two-fold for the remedy remains an exceptional departure from the 
very tenet of corporate personality and provides more certainty of what is required to pierce the 




                                                
338 See further Chapter 6. 
339 See Chapter 6. 
 79 
BIBLIOGRAPHY  
PRIMARY SOURCES  
Statutes  
Close Corporations Act 69 of 1984 
Companies Act 61 of 1973 
Companies Act 71 of 2008 
Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2009. 
Income Tax Act 58 of 1962. 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996  
International Instruments  
Canada Business Corporations Act R.S.C. 1985, c. C-44. 
Corporations Act 50 of 2001. 
Income Tax Act (Canada) (R.S.C., 1985, c. 1 (5th Supp.)) 
Limited Liability Act 1855 (18 & 19 Vict c 133) 
Usury Act 73 of 1968 
Case law  
Absa Bank Ltd v Moore 2017 (1) SA 255 (CC) 
Airport Cold Storage (Pty) Ltd v Ebrahim and Others [2007] ZAWCHC 25; 2008 (2) SA 303 (C) 
Al-Khafari & Sons v Pema and Others NNO 2010 (2) SA 360 (W) 
Amlin (SA) Pty Ltd v Van Kooij 2008 (2) SA 558 (C) 
Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others (CCT 27/03) [2004] 
ZACC 15 
Bertie Van Zyl (Pty) Ltd and Another v Minister for Safety and Security and Others (CCT 77/08) [2009] 
ZACC 11 
 80 
Botha v Van Niekerk 1983 (3) SA 513 (W). 
Cape Pacific v Lubner Controlling Investments (Pty) Ltd 1995 (4) SA 790 (A). 
Commissioner for Inland Revenue v Richmond Estates (Pty) Ltd 1956 (1) SA 602 (A) 606  
Dadoo Ltd and Others v Krugersdorp Municipal Council 1920 AD 530 
Dalrymple v Colonial Treasurer 1910 TS 372 
ERF 3183/1 Ladysmith (Pty) and Another v CIR 58 SATC 229 
Ex Parte Gore NO and Others NNO [2013] 2 All SA 437 (WCC). 
Four Wheel Drive Accessory Distributors CC v Leshni Rattan NO 2018 JDR 2203 (SCA) 
Firstrand Bank Ltd t/a Rand Merchant Bank & another v Master of the High Court, Cape Town & others 
[2013] ZAWCHC 173 (11 November 2013) 
Haygro Catering BK v Van der Merwe en Andere 1996 (4) SA 1063 (C). 
Hughes v Ridley 2010 (1) SA 381 (KZP) 
Hülse-Reutter v Gödde 2001 (4) SA 1336 (SCA) 
Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and 
Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others v Smit NO and Others 2001 (1) SA 545 
(CC) 
Jacobs en ’n Ander v Waks en Andere 1992 (1) SA 521 (A) 
KPMG Chartered Accountants v Securefin (644/07) [2009] ZASCA 7 
Knoop N.O. and Others v Birkenstock Properties (Pty) Ltd. And Others [2009] ZAFSHC 67 
Lategan and Another NNO v Boyes and Another 1980 (4) SA 191 (T). 
Lennard’s Carrying Co Ltd v Asiatic Petroleum Co Ltd [1914–15] All ER Rep 280 (HL) 283 
London and Others v Department of Transport, Roads and Public Works, Northern Cape and Others 
(1035/2018) [2019] ZASCA 144 
 81 
Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd 2016 (4) SA 121 (CC) 
Manong & Associates (Pty) Ltd v Minister of Public Works 2010 (2) SA 167 (SCA) 
Maye Serobe (Pty) Ltd v Lewusa Obo Members and Others (J 2377/12) [2015] ZALCJHB 116 
Natal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality (920/2010) [2012] ZASCA 13 (15 March 2012) 
Northern Homes Ltd v Steel-Space Industries Ltd (1976) 57 DLR (3d) 309 
Philotex (Pty) Ltd and Others v J R Snyman and Others 1998 (2) SA 138 (SCA). 
Re GJ Mannix Ltd [1984] 1 NZLR 309  
Road Accident Fund v Sauls [2001] ZASCA 135 
S v Zuma and Others 1995(2) SA 642 (CC)   
TJ Jonck BK h/a Bothaville Vleismark v Du Plessis NO en ’n Ander 1998 (1) SA 971 
Foreign case law  
642947 Ontario Ltd. v. Fleischer, 2001 CanLII 8623 (ON CA) 
801962 Ontario Limited v. MacKenzie Trust Co., [1994] O.J. No. 2105 (Gen. Div.). 
Bank voor Handel en Scheepvaart N. V. v. Slatford, [ 1953] 1 Q.B. 248 
Berkley v. Third Ave. Ry. Co., 155 N.E. 58 (N.Y., 1926) 
Broderip v Salomon, [1895] 2 Ch 323 at 339 (CA). 
Clarkson Co Ltd v Zhelka, [1967] 2 OR 565 
Conseil de la Santé (Montréal) v. City of Montreal (1994) 3 S.C.R. 29 (S.C.C.) 
De Salaberry Realties Ltd. v. M.NR (1974), 46 D.L.R. (3d) 100 (F.C.T.D.) 
Debora v Debora 2006 CanLII 40663 (ON C.A.), 
Kosmopoulus v Constitution Insurance Co. Of Canada [1987] 1 S.C.R. 2 
Lazarus Estates Ltd v Beasley [1956] 1 QB (CA) 
LiButti v. United States, 107 F.3d 110, 119 (2d Cir. 1997) 
Litchfield Asset Mgmt. Corp. v. Howell, 799 A.2d. 298, 312 (Conn. App. Ct. 2002) 
Lynch v. Segal [2006] O.J. No. 4810 (QL) (C.A.). 
 82 
Mull v. Colt 31 F.R.D. 154,163 (S.D.N.Y.) 
Palmolive Manufacturing Co (Ontario) v R, [1933] SCR 131 
Parkland Plumbing & Heating Ltd. v. Minaki Lodge Resort 2002 Inc. (2009) 305 D.L.R. 4th 577 
(ONC.A.) 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Limited [2013] 2 AC 415 
Sun Indalex Finance v United Steelworkers 2013 SCC 6. 
Saloman v Saloman and Co. Ltd [1897] AC 22 
Shoppers Drug Mart v. 6470360 Canada Inc. Energyshop Consulting Inc./Powerhouse Energy Management Inc. 
(Ont CA, 2014). 
Transamerica Life Insurance Co of Canada v Canada Life Assurance Co (1996), 28 OR (3d) 423 
Yaiguaje v Chevron Corporation 2018 ONCA 472 
Wildman v Wildman (2006), 273 D.L.R. (4th) 37 
Worldwide Carriers, Lt v. Aris Steamship Co. 301 F.Supp. 64 (S.D.N.Y., 1968) 
SECONDARY SOURCES  
Literature  
Blackman, Michael Commentary on the Companies Act (2002) Volume 1 Juta and Co. 
Cassim, Farouk et al Contemporary Company Law 2 ed (2012) 
Collier-Reed, Debbie and Lehmann, Karin eds. Basic principles of business law. LexisNexis, 2010 
The Concise Oxford Dictionary (D Thompson (ed) 9ed (Clarendon Press 1995) 
Delport, tier et al ‘Henochsberg on the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 2ed Butterworths: Lexis Nexis, 
(2011) 
International Institute for the Unification of Private Law, Principles of International Commercial 
Contracts (Rome 1994). 
Kentridge, Sydney Comparative Law in Constitutional Adjudication, The South African 
Experience in JUDICIAL RECOURSE TO FOREIGN LAW: A NEW SOURCE OF INSPIRATION? (Basil 
Markesinis & Jörg Fedtke eds., UCL Press 2006) 
 83 
Mccorquodale, Robert and L Page, Deva, Surya and Bilchitz, David eds. Building a treaty on business 
and human rights: context and contours. Cambridge University Press, 2017 
Mugova, Shame. "Opportunities and Pitfalls of Corporate Social Responsibility: An 
Introduction." Opportunities and Pitfalls of Corporate Social Responsibility. Springer, Cham, 2019 
Potter, Kimberly, Maric, Vaso & Stephenson, Mitch. ‘Fraud Unravels Everything: A limited 
Justification for Piercing the Corporate Veil’ in Annual Review of Civil Litigation (Toronto: 
Thomson Reuters, 2019) 
Wan, Marco ed. Reading the Legal Case: Cross Currents Between Law and the Humanities. Routledge, 
2012. 
Journal articles  
Bainbridge, Stephen "Abolishing Veil Piercing" (2001) 26:3 J Corp L 479 
Basson, Johann "Corporate Governance and Personal Liability in Terms of Section 424 (1) of the 
Companies Act or Section 65 (1) of the Close Corporations Act." The South African Journal of 
Industrial Engineering 11.2 (2000). 
Blumberg, Phillip The Law of Corporate Groups: Procedural Problems In The Law Of Parent 
And Subsidiary Corporations 8 (1983). 
Braithwaite, John Rules and principles: A theory of legal certainty. Austl. J. Leg. Phil., 27 (2002). 
Cassim, Rehana ‘Piercing the corporate veil: Unconscionable abuse under the Companies Act 71 of 2008’ 
August 2012 De Rebus 22. 
Cassim, Rehana Piercing the Veil under Section 20(9) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008: A New 
Direction, 26 S. Afr. Mercantile L.J. 307 (2014). 
Coffee, John ‘“No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick”: An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem 
of Corporate Punishment’ (1981) 79 Michigan L Rev 386. 
Condon, Mary "Of Butterflies and Bitterness?: Legal Fictions in Corporate and Securities Law" in 
Ysolde Gendreau, ed., Les fiction du droit = Fiction in the law (Montreal, Editions Themis, 2001), 
Corder, Hugh 'Crowbars and Cobwebs: Executive Autocracy and Law in South Africa' (1989) 5 
SAJHR 1 
Davids, LC ‘The lingering question: Some perspective on the lifting of the corporate veil’ (1994) 
TSAR 155 
 84 
Domanski, Andrew 'Piercing the Corporate Veil - A New Direction?' (1986) 103 S.A.L.J. 224 
Easterbrook, Frank and Fischel, Daniel Limited Liability and the Corporation, 52 U. Chi. L. Rev. 
89 (1985) 
Ebner, Kim "Close Corporations and the personal liability of members: company law." Without 
Prejudice 8.8 (2008) 
Farrar, John Fraud, Fairness and Piercing the Corporate Veil, 16 Can. Bus. L.J. 474 (1990) 
Gevurtz, Franklin “Piercing Piercing: An Attempt to Lift the Veil of Confusion Surrounding the 
Doctrine of Piercing the Corporate Veil.” Or. L. Rev. 76 (1997) 
Gwanyanya, Mason “The South African Companies Act and the realisation of corporate human 
rights responsibilities.” Potchefstroom Electronic Law Journal/Potchefstroomse Elektroniese Regsblad 18.1 
(2015) 
Hlophe, John "The Role of Judges in a Transformed South Africa-Problems, Challenges and 
Prospects." S. African LJ 112 (1995) 
Khimji, Mohammed & Nicholls, Christopher Piercing the Corporate Veil in the Canadian 
Common Law Courts: An Empirical Study, 41 Queen’s L.J. 207 (2015) 
Landers, Jonathan ‘A Unified Approach to the Parent, Subsidiary, and Affiliate Question in 
Bankruptcy’ (1975) 42:4 U Chicago L Rev 589  
Levenberg, Peter ‘The Mystery of the Corporate Veil: Comparing Anglo-American Jurisdictions.’ 
Penn St. JL & Int’l Aff. 7 (2019) 
Lipton, Phillip. ‘The Introduction of Limited Liability into the English and Australian Colonial 
Companies Acts: Inevitable Progression or Chaotic History.’ Melb. UL Rev. 41 (2017): 1278. 
Lipton, Phillip ‘The mythology of Salomon's case and the law dealing with the tort liabilities of 
corporate groups: an historical perspective.’ Monash UL Rev. 40 (2014) 
Macey, Jonathan and Mitts, Joshua ‘Finding order in the morass: The three real justifications for 
piercing the corporate veil.’ Cornell L. Rev. 100 (2014) 
MacLean, Jason ‘Chevron Corp. v. Yaiguaje: Canadian Law and the New Global Economic and 
Environmental Realities’, 57 Can. Bus. L.J. 367 (2016) 
 85 
Maswazi, Bayethe ‘The doctrine of precedent and the value of s 39(2) of the Constitution’, De 
Rebus April 2017. 
Nicholls, Christopher Beyond the Veil: Wildman v. Wildman, 44 Can. Bus. L.J. 448 (2007) 
Neyers, Jason Canadian Corporate Law, Veil-Piercing, and the Private Law Model Corporation, 
50 U. Toronto L.J. 173 (2000) 
Salim, Mohammed "Corporate insolvency: separate legal personality and directors' duties to 
creditors." UiTM Law Review 2 (2004) 
Schoeman, Nicolene  'Piercing the corporate veil under the New Companies Act' (2012) De Rebus 
June 2012. 
Titus, Silus "Key reasons why small businesses fail." Accredited Associate of The Institute for Independent 
Businesses (2004) 
Ziegel, Jason 'Creditors as corporate stakeholders: the quiet revolution - an Anglo-Canadian 
perspective' (1993) 43 University o/Toronto Law Journal 511 
Reports and Explanatory memoranda  
Child Support Guidelines Promulgated under the Divorce Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.)). 
South African Company Law for the 21st Century: Guidelines for Corporate Law Reform, 
Government Gazette, 4 No 26493 23 June 2004 
Theses  
Glazer, Suellen Piercing the corporate veil of the close corporation with the Tax Administration Act. LLM Diss 
(2015) 
Tepre, Paul Liability deficit problem of multinational corporate groups: a proposal for legislative and judicial 
reform. Diss. University of British Columbia, (2017) 
Online Sources  
Farlax, ‘Remedy’. Available at https://legal-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/remedy. 
Henkeman, Meegan ‘Piercing the Corporate Veil’, Polity, Available at: 
https://www.polity.org.za/article/piercing-the-corporate-veil-2014-04-10 [Last Accessed on 9 
October 2019]. 
Rawoot, Ilham ‘Companies Act Farce’ Mail & Guardian. Available at 
https://mg.co.za/article/2010-04-07-companies-act-farce 
